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I.

INTRODUCTION

G

lobal governance of outer space activities faces many new regulatory
challenges stemming from increased private and public ventures. In 1978,
Donald Kessler, a NASA scientist, cautioned that the proliferation of space
debris, a byproduct of space activities, may generate a cascade effect of uncontrolled collisions, undermining the use of Earth’s orbits (“Kessler Syndrome”). 1 But even without such catastrophic consequences, space debris is
an externality generated by those who launch the material to outer space,
which increases the resources all participants must expend to conduct space
activities. 2 For policymakers, the main concerns stem from the effects of
debris on space traffic management and the potential risks to life and property from possible accidents. 3

1. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites:
The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 2637 (1978). See also
Paul B. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, 83 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW & COMMERCE 475,
476–82 (2018); STEPHAN HOBE, SPACE LAW 112–14 (2019); Alexander William Salter, Space
Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Orbital Commons, 19 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY
LAW REVIEW 221, 224–27 (2016).
2. On space debris as an international externality, see infra Section II.A.; see generally
Salter, supra note 1; Akhil Rao & Giacomo Rondina, Cost in Space: Debris and Collison Risk in
the Orbital Commons (2020), https://akhilrao.github.io/assets/working_papers/Cost_in_
Space.pdf; Molly K. Macauley, The Economics of Space Debris: Estimating the Costs and Benefits of
Debris Mitigation, 115 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 160 (2015).
3. See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2007), https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf [hereinafter COPUOS Guidelines]; G.A. Res. 74/82, International
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 26, 2019); Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, IADC-02-01 Rev. 1, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
(2007), https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/iadc_mitigation_guidelines_rev_1_sep07.
pdf [hereinafter IADC Guidelines]; Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the
Vice President et al., Space Policy Directive-3: National Space Traffic Management Policy
(June 18, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/space-policydirective-3-national-space-traffic-management-policy/ [hereinafter SPD-3]. Others approached it from a purely environmental angle, see, e.g., Vishakha Gupta, Critique of the International Law on Protection of the Outer Space Environment, 14 ASTROPOLITICS 20 (2016); Mary
Button, Cleaning Up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty as a Model for Regulating
Orbital Debris, 37 WILLIAM & MARY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 539
(2013).
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This challenge facing the international community is further exacerbated
by increasing activities in space, 4 reduced governmental control, and incentives for developing countries to attract space investors. 5 The underlying policy problem is compounded by the realization that the generation of space
debris is, in many instances, a byproduct of developing capabilities and conducting certain space activities that provide for national progress and a wide
array of domestic benefits. 6 In designing a global order for space debris mitigation, the international community must, therefore, prioritize the protection and promotion of the benefits and reduction of the costs from space
activities for all participants, rather than be fixated on mitigating a particular
activity’s externality.
The potential adverse effects for all participants indicate that the mitigation of space debris provides a classic case for international cooperation. 7
Yet, as this article will explain, the international rules currently in place are
inadequate 8 and can hardly be considered as effective instruments for swaying the policy choices of participants towards reducing space debris. 9 Scientists, policymakers, and scholars have proposed various national and international paths to confront the challenges posed by increased debris. International legal scholarship, in particular, has proposed a variety of international regimes to govern the interactions between the participants and to
encourage both the reduction of future debris generation and the removal

4. See Salter, supra note 1, at 223–25; Paul B. Larsen, Minimum International Norms For
Mitigating Space Traffic, Space Debris, and Near Earth Object Impacts, 83 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
AND COMMERCE 739, 754–55 (2018); Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at
481; Arpit Gupta, Regulating Space Debris as Separate from Space Objects, 41 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 224, 225 (2019).
5. See Larsen, Minimum International Norms For Mitigating Space Traffic, supra note 4. See also
Gershon Hasin, Developing a Global Order for Space Resources: A Regime Evolution Approach, 52
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2020).
6. Anél Ferreira-Snyman, The Environmental Responsibility of States for Space Debris and the
Implications for Developing Countries in Africa, 46 COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 19, 44–55 (2013); Economic and Social Council, Exploring
Space Technologies for Sustainable Development and the Benefits of International Research Collaboration
in this Context, U.N. Doc. E/CN.16/2020/3 (Jan. 13, 2020).
7. Salter, supra note 1, at 237–38.
8. See Joseph Kurt, Triumph of the Space Commons: Addressing the Impending Space Debris
Crisis Without an International Treaty, 40 WILLIAM & MARY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 305, 313 (2015).
9. See infra Section I.B.
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of existing debris, including mandatory international standards, increased liability, and taxation. 10
Most scholarship on outer space activities tends to view the corpus of
global governance of the commons as individual specimens to be adapted
and applied to space. Rather than evaluating other international regimes as
“roadmaps” from which to deduce not only which but, critically, why certain
rules were installed by participants, scholars propose to adapt, mutatis mutandis, other international regimes to confront the space debris challenge, without recognizing the distinct interactions underlining those regimes’ development. This approach is misguided. It overlooks the fact that the international
lawmaking process of authoritative decision-making is complex and requires
careful balancing of the goals and interests of various participants exercising
different degrees of leverage. 11 Since each regime is uniquely produced by
this process, it is extremely problematic to claim that a regime governing a
specific sphere of human activity can simply be applied to another regime
that may, in fact, reflect different sets of participants, interactions, incentives,
and leverages guiding its unique development. Such an approach may begin
an analysis but is unlikely to result in success. 12 While international regulation
is targeted at ameliorating the effects of a particular international externality
or “problem,” the rules are predominantly a product of compromises and
“package-deals,” 13 accounting for various factors besides finding the most
efficient method for solving the specific problem.
10. See, e.g., PETER STUBBE, STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SPACE DEBRIS ch. 6(III)
(2017); Arpit Gupta, supra note 4; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1; Rada
Popova & Volker Schaus, The Legal Framework for Space Debris Remediation as a Tool for Sustainability in Outer Space, 5 AEROSPACE (2018), https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/5/2/55];
Megan R. Plantz, Orbital Debris: Out of Space, 40 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 585 (2012); Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6; Button, supra note 3.
11. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 253 (1967). See also
Harold Hongju Koh, Is There A “New” New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 559 (2007). Although the author appreciates that international law does not have a recognized legislator, the functional term “international lawmaking process” refers to the complex process through which international law develops
through the interactions between affected stakeholders and decisionmakers.
12. See, e.g., Hasin, supra note 5, § IV.C.
13. See Hugo Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law
and the Package Deal, 79 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 871 (1985). See also,
1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, 29–
85 (Myron Nordquist ed., 1985); Xuexia Liao, The LOSC as a Package Deal and its Implications
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As Professors Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and W. Michael
Reisman have shown, the development of international law is a process of
claims and counterclaims, attuned to the interactions between the participants, based on their goals, interests, and leverages. 14 As Professor Harold
Hongju Koh described, this process occurs transnationally through a circular
process of interactions, interpretations, and internalizations. 15 Through this
transnational legal process, international law develops in a repetitive process
in which norms are internationalized from the domestic into the international sphere, promogulated and internalized through domestic interactions,
to then be internationalized again. 16 This appreciation for the driving forces
of the international lawmaking process will inform this article’s identification
and proposal of an optimum global order for space debris mitigation, one
which promotes the aggregated gain in values for all participants.
This article applies the international regime evolution approach the author developed in a previous article 17 to the regulation of space debris by
focusing on three elements: feasibility, effectiveness, and manageability. For
an international regime to constitute a probable evolution of international
law, it must be feasible, meaning that participants are likely to adopt such
governance through their interactions based on accommodating their conflicting goals, interests, and leverages. Effectiveness considers the optimization of international values for all participants, 18 which may prescribe a less
than perfect solution for any putative “problem.” Manageability is the final
yet critical element. It considers a regime’s opposability by outliers, in other
words, the ability to sway the policy choices of reluctant participants to conform with effectiveness. This approach will be applied in both a descriptive
and a prescriptive manner.
for Determination of Customary International Law, 35 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE
1, 9–12 (2020).
14. See generally McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 11; MYRES S. MCDOUGAL
& WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA ch. 1 (1962).
15. See Koh, New Haven, supra note 11, at 567–68.
16. See id. at 566–68. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 181 (1996).
17. Hasin, supra note 5.
18. The international “values” are based on the New Haven School of International
Law and adapted to modern interactions. The term refers to desired events. The author
considers that wealth, skill or innovation, equity, security, health and safety, human dignity,
and environmental protection are among the modern international values that participants
desire to optimized. See further infra Section III.A.
AND COASTAL LAW
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As the article elucidates, global governance for space debris mitigation
will develop in three distinct stages: coordination, cooperation, and regulation. The effectiveness of the current international rules at the stage of coordination is undermined by present interactions. The article thus recommends that the international community adopt a dynamic, bottom-up, and
nationally-based cooperation regime to alleviate the risks posed by space debris and promote space activities. This regime will be feasible based on current interactions, effective at optimizing the aggregated gain in values, and
manageable vis-à-vis outliers. Such governance reconciles the interests of the
various participants involved, given the realities of the international lawmaking process. 19 As future developments may render these rules ineffective, the
final part will outline a further anticipated development.
Part II will describe the challenges posed by space debris and the current
international rules. Part III will survey the participants involved and the values the regime ought to optimize. Part IV will analyze other regimes proposed by scholars to deduce their appropriateness and shortcomings. Part V
will propose a dynamic international regime for mitigating space debris.
II.

SPACE DEBRIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Delineating the Space Debris Problem
The term “space debris” refers to an externality of space activities that creates risks and increases the costs of space ventures for all participants. This
debris varies in shapes and sizes, from non-functioning satellites to fragments of spacecraft or launching equipment and even small pieces of metal
or paint. 20 Although large pieces of debris can be monitored, tracked, and
possibly avoided, smaller pieces may escape current sensor capabilities. 21
These small pieces of debris, potentially numbering in the millions of fragments, pose a significant risk. 22 Traveling at high velocity, a piece of paint
can wreak havoc on a satellite or spacecraft. 23 Participants must thus incur
19. As further elaborated below the various participants have distinct goals, interests,
and leverages to affect the international lawmaking process. They will be discussed in four
groups: space-capable States, space-incapable States, private parties, and international organizations. See infra Section III.B.
20. Nodir Adilov et al., An Economic Analysis of Earth Orbit Pollution, 60 ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 81, 83–85 (2015); Rao & Rondina, supra note 2, at 3.
21. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 24.
22. HOBE, supra note 1, at 112–-13; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 37.
23. HOBE, supra note 1, at 112–-13.
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costs to avoid collisions with debris and, if unsuccessful, may suffer losses
due to accidents. 24
While the risks are real, uncertainty surrounds the specific adverse effects
and timetables for the cascade process, 25 as further confirmed by Kessler’s
2010 reevaluation of his analysis. 26 In other words, while added space debris
may increase costs and risks, the extent of its future proliferation is unclear,
as is the possibility and tipping point for a potential catastrophic Kessler
Syndrome. 27
In contrast to scholars, who assert that such risks require an urgent remedy, 28 international policymakers have responded in measured steps by
adopting only non-legally binding guidelines and promoting declaratory
commitments. 29 This may stem from a discounting of risks by the latter because, given the vastness of space, the probability of collisions with small
pieces of unidentifiable and untraceable debris is minimal at this point.
Nonetheless, the risks and costs will increase unless participants undertake
mitigation efforts. Costly maneuvers have already been executed to evade
collisions, 30 and while accidents have thus far been rare, debris proliferation
and the introduction of mega-constellations will increase their likelihood.
While some elements of space debris, such as radioactive components,
may pose increased environmental or safety risks, 31 space debris can be accurately depicted, in general terms, as a traffic management problem that
mainly affects the costs and risks associating with coordinating and safely
24. Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 29; Salter, supra note 1, at 227–32; Kurt, supra note
8, at 308.
25. See Kurt, supra note 8, at 316; Rao & Rondina, supra note 2, at 3.
26. Kessler et al., The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space Operations (2010),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.394.6767&rep=rep1&type=
pdf.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 92; Ram S. Jakhu, Yaw Out Nyampong &
Tommaso Sgobba, Regulatory Framework and Organization for Space Debris Removal and on Orbit
Servicing of Satellites, 4 JOURNAL OF SPACE SAFETY ENGINEERING 129, 129–30 (2017); Chelsea Muñoz-Patchen, Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property
in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty, 19 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233,
241 (2018).
29. COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 3; IADC Guidelines, supra note 3; Artemis Accords, Oct. 13, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf.
30. Jeff Foust, Space Station Maneuvers to Avoid Debris, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://spacenews.com/space-station-maneuvers-to-avoid-debris/.
31. See Button, supra note 3, at 545.
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conducting launches, in-space activities, and re-entry. As such, a certain degree of adaptation is possible via the implementation of increased tracking,
avoidance, and protective capabilities. 32 Yet, adaptation alone is insufficient
as further proliferation may reduce its effectiveness. 33 International regulation must therefore strike a balance between adaptation and mitigation.
B. Current International Rules
To properly anticipate the regime’s evolution through the international lawmaking process first requires evaluating the degree to which current international rules affect the policy choices of various participants. It is important
to appreciate that the corpus of international law governing a putative subject matter or activity is complex, potentially encompassing multiple regimes,
with direct and indirect effects, intentional or inadvertent. 34 In respect of
space debris, direct rules include those codified in international treaties relating to outer space activities, non-legally binding guidelines, 35 U.N. General
Assembly resolutions, 36 and general international law. Given these rules’ relative weakness and vagueness as they pertain to debris, the importance of
indirect rules increases. As explained below, space debris mitigation is affected by rules primarily directed at other spheres of activity, such as international environmental law and international investment law, presenting
challenges and opportunities.
1. Treaties Regulating Outer Space Activities
Five treaties have been concluded to govern outer space activities: (1) Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer
32. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 481–82; Joseph N. Pelton,
Tracking of Orbital Debris and Avoidance of Satellite Collisions, in HANDBOOK OF SATELLITE APPLICATIONS (Joseph N. Pelton et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017), https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4614-6423-5_106-2; Space Debris and Space Traffic Management,
AEROSPACE (Nov. 14, 2018), https://aerospace.org/article/space-debris-and-space-trafficmanagement.
33. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 482.
34. See Karen J. Alter & Kal Raustiala, The Rise of International Regime Complexity (UCLA
School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-47, Northwestern Public Law Research
Paper No. 17-30, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3085043.
35. COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 3; IADC Guidelines, supra note 3.
36. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 74/82, supra note 3.
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Space Treaty); 37 (2) Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention); 38 (3) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention); 39
(4) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; 40 and (5) Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 41
Of these, only the first four may be deemed effective international law between the space-capable States, 42 and only the first three prescribe norms
affecting space debris. Commentators recognize these treaties’ limited applicability but overestimate their effects on participants’ decisions regarding
space debris mitigation.
The Outer Space Treaty was formulated during the Cold War when private space activities were works of fiction and the challenges of space traffic
management were unappreciated. The appropriateness of the Outer Space
Treaty as an instrument of global governance for modern interactions is thus
doubtful. Many authors, however, attribute somewhat excessive qualities to
this treaty, including labeling it “magna carta” or claiming that some of its

37. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
38. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
39. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
40. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
41. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21.
42. The Moon Treaty is subscribed to by less than twenty States, none of which are the
leading space-capable States. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining: International and
National Legal Aspects, 26 MICHIGAN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 83, 85, 89–90
(2017).
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provisions constitute jus cogens. 43 Others purport to “elevate” some of its provisions to the status of customary international law; 44 a shaky proposition
given the absence of any meaningful State practice, especially by non-party
States. Under scrutiny, the treaty reveals itself as merely a treaty of “principles,” as its title prescribes, drafted using broad language, lacking any enforcement mechanism, and allowing rapid, unconditional denunciation.
These characteristics constitute part of the “context” for the purpose of interpretation as provided for by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 45 and the application of an evolutionary interpretation of its generic
terms. 46
Two additional treaties to consider are the Liability Convention and the
Registration Convention. The latter imposes an obligation on States to register the space objects they launch, while the former concerns standards of
liability for damage caused to another State party. Although the Liability
Convention provides for the establishment of a claims commission, its award
is a recommendation to be considered in good faith, and it only becomes
legally binding if the parties consent. 47 As for registration, compliance by
participants has been less than perfect. 48
In respect of space debris mitigation, these three treaties—but chiefly
the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention—are cited for two somewhat interrelated issues: the obligation and the ramification. In basic terms,
scholarship considers whether these treaties impose any obligations on
43. See, e.g., Edwin W. Paxson III, Note, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration:
Space Law and Economic Development, 14 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 487,
489 (1993); Ram S. Jakhu & Steven Freeland, The Relationship Between the Outer Space Treaty
and Customary International Law, 59 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
SPACE LAW 183 (2016); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 73 (2d
ed. 2018).
44. See, e.g., RICKY J. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MINERALS IN OUTER SPACE 154–55 (2012); Paul B. Larsen, Asteroid Legal Regime: Time for a
Change, 39 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW 289 (2014); Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 43, at 191–94.
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
46. Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 214, ¶ 66 (July 13).
47. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XIX.
48. See Priyank D. Doshi, Regulating the Final Frontier: Asteroid Mining and the Need for a
New Regulatory Regime, 1 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
LAW 198, 205–6 (2016); Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani & Jonathan C. McDowell, Critical
Issues Related to Registration of Space Objects and Transparency of Space Activities, 143 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 406, 413–14 (2018).
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States to mitigate space debris, and whether they prescribe responsibility or
liability for any consequences resulting from failure to mitigate space debris. 49 The objective is to convince participants to reduce debris by imposing
an obligation with a “stick” of liability attached. The complementary route
concerns active debris removal and centers around the proposition that as
States retain ownership of even the smallest pieces of debris, other States are
precluded from deorbiting or otherwise interfering with or removing the debris. 50 Scholars then propose solutions to overcome this supposed hurdle
through treaty interpretation or amendment. 51 As this section will explain,
such approaches are unconvincing and inconsistent with an evolving interpretation and the principle of effet utile, and are unlikely to affect the decisionmaking process of participants.
Liability and responsibility under the space treaties are linked to the
scope of the term “space object.” Current scholarship disagrees on whether
space debris constitutes a space object 52 under the treaties. The inclusion of
“component parts” as space objects in Outer Space Treaty Articles VII and
VIII and Liability Convention Article I is raised to justify considering all debris, including pieces of paint or metal, to constitute space objects. 53 Thus,
the argument goes, the State launching or procuring the launch is liable for
any damage caused by its debris to another State. Accordingly, the launching
State is liable for all damage caused by debris on the Earth’s surface or to
aircraft, while liability for damage in outer space is limited to proof of
“fault.” 54 In an attempt to overcome the limiting criterion of fault, some have

49. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 272; Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 236; Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 37; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 491.
50. Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 243–44; Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247; Larsen,
Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 486, 518–19.
51. See, e.g., Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 244–52; Joel A. Dennerley, State Liability
for Space Object Collisions: The Proper Interpretation of “Fault” for the Purposes of International Space
Law, 29 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 (2018); Jakhu, Nyampong &
Sgobba, supra note 28, at 131–32; Melissa K. Force, When the Nature and Duration of Space
Becomes Appropriation: Use as a Legal Predicate for a State’s Objection to Active Debris Removal, 56
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 405 (2013).
52. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 483; STUBBE, supra note 10, at
388.
53. See Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 235–38; Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 232–36;
see also STUBBE, supra note 10, at 389.
54. Liability Convention, supra note 38, arts. II–III.
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suggested lenient criteria for finding fault 55 or even to dispense with it entirely. 56 This distinction, however, seems to be consistent with the realization
that small debris in space is either unidentifiable or an uncontrollable byproduct of space activities, and, while these smaller pieces are likely to burn
in the atmosphere, only large, and therefore easily identifiable, debris is likely
to cause damage on the Earth’s surface or to aircraft.
Scholarship needs to consider whether the inclusion of “all debris” under
these rules is sensible, effective, or consistent with current realities. As this
section will illustrate, to sway the policy choices of participants towards the
optimum global order, it may be preferable to exclude, at the very least, small
or unidentifiable pieces of debris from the application of these treaty rules. 57
i. Obligation
What obligations do States have under current law with regard to space debris? Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty imposes a “due regard” standard
on States. It is reasonable to conclude that this standard requires States to
use their best efforts to mitigate the generation of space debris. However,
the proposition that all debris generation must be avoided as “harmful contamination” seems to stretch the term’s natural and ordinary meaning, which
contains “biological, chemical or nuclear” elements, to cover an externality
that causes mere obstruction or complication of use. 58 While some activities,
such as the testing of anti-satellite weapons, may generate debris to a level
that constitutes “harmful interference with activities” of others, Article IX
prescribes merely “consultation.” This suggests the softness of the intended
degree of obligation vis-à-vis a disruptive element such as debris.
A best-efforts obligation is not only a textually reasonable interpretation
of the treaty but is also consistent with the evolving context, including increased private activities. The obligation to authorize and supervise private
activities indicates that limiting sovereign obligations to best-efforts is sound
and would not exceed States’ roles and capabilities. Given the anticipated
growth in private activities, any higher degree of obligation is unlikely to gain
support or compliance by space-capable States.

55. See generally Dennerley, supra note 51; see also Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247.
56. See Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 37.
57. See Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note
1, at 486.
58. See STUBBE, supra note 10, at 155.
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The recently concluded Artemis Accords between the United States and
its allied space-capable States are consistent with this interpretation. The Accords’ purpose is to “establish a common vision via a practical set of principles, guidelines and best practices.” 59 With regard to space debris mitigations,
the parties “commit to plan for the mitigation of orbital debris,” 60 with their
commitment to limit the generation of new debris confined “to the extent
practicable,” 61 which is a best-efforts obligation. Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that a best-efforts standard of obligation, while lower than some
scholars would desire, constitutes a reasonable interpretation that is likely to
be acceptable to active participants.
ii. Ownership
Many scholars and commentators assume that “ownership” under the Outer
Space Treaty somehow precludes an interested participant from actively removing space debris. 62 The proposition that without international law sanction a State lacks the right to remove destructive elements posing significant
risks is an absurd result that may precipitate conflict, thus undermining the
minimum order. But the application of such a rule lacks effet utile and undermines the legal maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, 63 mandating its reconsideration.
Reisman explained that when considering international incidents, it is
more important to evaluate the responses of elites in other States than
whether the incidents constitute a violation of a rule. Rather than reacting to
incidents “in judgmental fashion, assuming that the norm in question is a
priori and enduring,” 64 it is more important to evaluate “the reactions of other
relevant actors and, through those reactions, the subjective conceptions of
59. Artemis Accords, supra note 29, § 1.
60. Id. § 12(1).
61. Id. § 12(2).
62. See, e.g., Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 486, 518–19; MuñozPatchen, supra note 28, at 246; Jakhu, Nyampong & Sgobba, supra note 28, at 131–33; Arpit
Gupta, supra note 4, at 238–41.
63. On this principle see Jutta Brunnée, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [Use your own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another], MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (last updated Mar. 2010), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1607.
64. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of
International Law, 10 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (1984) [hereinafter Reisman, Incidents].
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right and/or tolerable behavior entertained by those other actors.” 65 Assume, arguendo, that the United States decided to conduct or authorize a mission to remove small and unidentifiable debris from orbit. The potential responses from other space-capable participants to whom the debris might
“belong” include silence, support, emulation, protest, or retaliation. 66 It
should be evident that the prospect of retaliation is unlikely, yet it propels
scholars to consider the regime of ownership as a legal obstacle.
Should a participant decide to retaliate by initiating a dispute settlement
procedure, the first hurdle would be to establish jurisdiction, as the Outer
Space Treaty lacks such a mechanism. As for the International Court of Justice, even if jurisdiction could be established, an adverse judgment or opinion
is improbable and, even then, unproductive. It is a leap to assume that the
prospect of a decision mandating cessation or advising of prospective reparations would deter a participant from removing the debris.
Regardless of whether it would even be possible to prove ownership of
a piece of debris that was pushed into the atmosphere and burned, rendering
it unidentifiable, it is unlikely that a participant will expend the resources
necessary to sustain such a claim for limited gain. First, active removal of
debris lends itself to the defense of “necessity” as an activity safeguarding an
essential interest with minimal effects on the “owner.” 67 Although necessity
commands a high threshold, 68 it is a sensible proposition. But the exclusion
of wrongfulness does not prejudice the “question of compensation for any
material loss caused by the act.” 69 Thus, irrespective of wrongfulness, such a
tribunal award could include reparations. Exploring this remedy, however,
exposes a deeper flaw.
Economist Alexander Salter attaches value to existing debris, based on
the costs and efforts of launching an equivalent mass of it into orbit, proposing that such material may therefore be valuable to the owners. 70 This,
65. Id. at 17.
66. For instance, when the United States recognized property rights to space resources,
silence, support, emulation, and protest were observed, but there was no retaliation. See
Hasin, supra note 5, § II(E).
67. See JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 305–15
(2013).
68. Id.
69. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 27(b), U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n art. 27(b), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC Articles on State Responsibility].
70. Salter, supra note 1, at 233–34.
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however, disregards the costs associated with collecting those fragments and
reprocessing them for use, rendering the actual value of the debris owned by
each participant quite unclear. In our scenario, the owner of the debris will
then be required to expend resources to prove to a tribunal the value of the
debris, which will be the compensation—the reparation—owed by our
“Good Samaritan” State. Irrespective of the futility of trying to prove the
value of small and unidentifiable pieces of debris, the perceived costs and
minimal benefits involved suggest that States are unlikely to resort to such
procedures. This renders the probability of the threat of a dispute settlement
process affecting the decision-making process quite imaginary.
The same analysis applies to the likelihood of retaliation through a countermeasure. A retaliatory violation must be proportional. 71 Because the value
of the debris to the owner is small and intangible, any countermeasure will
be limited in scope.
Additionally, attempts to stop the internationally beneficial collection of
space debris may result in negative public opinion, including criticism or lobbying from environmental activists, space entrepreneurs, or even the general
public. 72 Interestingly, Russia and China have indicated that interference with
their space objects may count as an act of aggression. 73 The scope and circumstances of their claims are unclear, and it is likewise unclear if they were
referring to space debris. Furthermore, it seems unrealistic to suggest that
Russia would go to war, employ trade instruments, or position nuclear weapons in space because the United States removed Russian debris.
It is technology and cost-effectiveness, 74 not governing international law,
that precludes active debris removal. Once debris removal becomes costeffective, a participant will execute it regardless of any purported ownership.
Such a conclusion is stronger for small and unidentifiable fragments. The
inclusion of all debris as “component parts” of “space objects” is simply
inconsistent with an evolutionary interpretation and the principle of effet utile.
71. On countermeasures, see generally the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra
note 69, ch. II and cmt.
72. While public opinion’s effect on Russian policy is limited, China considers its global
image important. See, e.g., Emma Graham-Harrison & Tom Phillips, China Hopes “Vaccine
Diplomacy” Will Restore its Image and Boost its Influence, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/29/china-hopes-vaccine-diplomacy-willrestore-its-image-and-boost-its-influence.
73. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 365.
74. See Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 94, 95; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 58–59; Salter,
supra note 1, at 232–38.
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iii. Ramification
As mentioned above, some scholars propose that space-capable States
should mitigate their production of debris or even remove debris they have
already produced because they may be held liable for any damage the debris
cause. This proposition does not withstand scrutiny.
Even assuming that the owner could be identified and, when relevant,
fault proven, for a rule of liability to affect policy choices it must be accompanied by procedural rights for its enforcement, which are absent from current international rules. The Outer Space Treaty does not provide such
rights, and under the Liability Convention, the owner must choose to compensate the affected party for damages 75 because any claims commission’s
award is legally binding only by choice. 76 Moreover, the vagueness of the
terms may be employed to argue against the scope of liability, as the Soviet
Union did following the crash of a Soviet satellite with a radioactive power
source in Canada. 77 Finally, a commission may find it difficult to render a
decision should the parties fail to agree on the applicable law. 78
The absurdity of this “stick” is further exposed when one considers a
collision in space resulting in—or caused by—unidentifiable or untraceable
pieces of debris. 79 It is unclear whether a post-accident analysis could even
deduce the responsible owner of the debris. Even if a piece of debris is identifiable, the owner State would only be liable if the collision, detected and
proved, was its fault, an ambiguous criterion requiring that a participant produce evidence to sustain it. In addition to the resources required to sustain a
claim, an injured participant incurs potential political costs associated with
the inter-State dispute settlement process. The effects of a dispute could spill
over and undermine cooperation in other aspects of inter-State relations,
such as investment, trade, or scientific exchange.
Absent procedural rights and given the low value of the debris, the ramification of liability proposed by some scholars to motivate States to reduce
debris is a paper tiger. It is unlikely to affect policy choices precisely because
the risk of retaliatory action by an injured participant is extremely low. This
75. Samuel Roth, Developing a Law of Asteroids: Constants, Variables, and Alternatives, 54
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 827, 846 (2016).
76. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XIX(2).
77. Roth, supra note 75, at 846.
78. Id. at 845.
79. See Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 246; Matthew Weinzierl, Space, the Final Economic Frontier, 32 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 173, 187 (2018).
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again indicates that an interpretation of space object as including all pieces
of debris lacks effet utile. An evolutionary and reasonable interpretation of the
space treaties would exclude small and untraceable pieces of debris from the
definition of space object and perhaps exclude even identifiable yet inoperable and unsalvageable objects.
2. Non-Legally Binding International Instruments
The corpus of international law includes non-legally binding instruments and
soft laws that affect the decision-making process of participants. 80 Scholars
have referred to some of these instruments, including General Assembly resolutions, as indicating opinio juris, which, if followed, would even generate
State practice. 81 Yet, practice consistent with a recommendation may stem
from its non-legally binding character rather than constitute an indication
that compliance is due to an instrument’s perceived legally binding nature.
Non-legally binding instruments relevant to space debris include General
Assembly resolutions 82 and general guidelines adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). 83 The guidelines adopted by COPUOS are based on those of the IADC, which is an
informal intergovernmental organization for cooperation between the space
agencies of space-capable States. 84
Both sets of guidelines were intentionally adopted as voluntary recommendations, and States have adopted laws implementing them in varying degrees of conformity. 85 Their implementation is imperfect, and participants
diverge from them due to conflicting objectives and interests, which may
80. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37–68 (2014) [hereinafter
BENVENISTI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE]. See also Steven Freeland, The Role of “Soft Law” in
Public International Law and its Relevance to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, in SOFT
LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW 9, 19 (Irmgard Marboe ed., 2012).
81. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Fifth Report on Identification of Customary International Law conclusion 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/717 (Mar. 14, 2018) [hereinafter
ILC, Customary Law]; Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (1973); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43,
at 370.
82. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 74/82, supra note 3.
83. COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 3; IADC Guidelines, supra note 3.
84. See Salter, supra note 1, at 226–27.
85. Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 241.
1089

International Law Studies

2021

include the reduction of regulatory burdens to facilitate the development of
private industry. Some authors have suggested that when States follow the
guidelines, this may generate State practice establishing customary international law, transforming the obligation to mitigate debris into binding international law. 86 Similarly, it is suggested that the mere failure to comply with
the guidelines may constitute fault for the purpose of establishing liability. 87
Such approaches, however, ignore the rules governing the identification of
customary international law.
The International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission (ILC) have stressed that a rule of customary international law may
emerge from the general, actual practice by States, which they perceive as
required by law (“opinio juris”). 88 While practice by a few participants could
be sufficient, 89 when rules originating in treaties are concerned, it is primarily
the practice of non-parties that is indicative of the relevant State practice. 90
This makes sense because practice by State-parties consistent with a treaty
may simply indicate compliance with treaty obligations. 91 Such considerations apply with equal or greater strength to a provision of an intentionally
non-legally binding instrument.
Recently, the ILC adopted its recommendations for the identification of
customary international law based on the report of Sir Michael Wood. 92 Conclusion 12 stipulates that while resolutions of international organizations, in
themselves, do not generate customary international law, they may “contribute to its development.” 93 However, the ILC also stressed that “regard must
86. See Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 30; Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 243–44; Kelly
A. Gable, Rules Regarding Space Debris: Preventing a Tragedy of the Commons, 50 PROCEEDINGS
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 257 (2007); HOBE, supra note 1, at 117–18; Larsen, Solving
the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 491. But see Plantz, supra note 10, at 609.
87. See Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247.
88. ILC, Customary Law, supra note 81; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.
It.; Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶ 55 (Feb. 3).
89. See, e.g., DONALD ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA 102–11 (2d ed. 2016).
90. Liao, supra note 13, at 7–8, 19–20.
91. Id. See also North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 76 (Feb. 20).
92. ILC, Customary Law, supra note 81; see also International Law Commission, Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.908 (May 17, 2018); Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission: Identification of Customary International
Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml (last
updated Apr. 16, 2020).
93. ILC, Customary Law, supra note 81.
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be had to the overall context,” 94 and State practice “must be sufficiently
widespread and representative, as well as consistent.” 95 Where “the practice
of a particular State varies,” the ILC explains that “the weight to be given to
that practice may, depending on the circumstances, be reduced.” 96
These understandings obviate the possibility that the guidelines reflect
customary international law. The COPUOS guidelines were adopted for
“voluntary” implementation, “to the greatest extent feasible” by member
States. 97 Absent any meaningful and actual practice by non-parties, a claim
of general State practice is unconvincing. Furthermore, given that implementation of the guidelines varies among States, practice is inconsistent. Critically, the context of the guidelines adoption and their voluntary nature undermine any proposition that their implementation is “undertaken with a
sense of legal . . . obligation.” 98
The guidelines, however, constitute an important element of the international lawmaking process. When sufficiently internalized by space-capable
States, 99 these norms are anticipated to internationalize, driving the development of international law both in the sense of best practices and perhaps
even rules. 100 As mentioned above, evidence for such internationalization
can be found in the Artemis Accords.
3. Indirect International Rules
States’ policy choices concerning debris mitigation are also shaped through
indirect rules, providing avenues to facilitate the optimum global order. This
section evaluates the degree to which international environmental law and
international investment law interrelate with space debris mitigation.

94. Id. conclusion 3(1).
95. Id. conclusion 8.
96. Id. conclusion 7(2).
97. COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 3, at 3.
98. ILC, Customary Law, supra note 81, conclusion 9.
99. It should, however, be noted that internalization is inconsistent, may be difficult to
measure, and may constitute only one reason for any outcomes observed on the international level.
100. See Koh, New Haven, supra note 11, at 566–68.
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i. International Environmental Law
Many authors turn to international environmental law when considering
global governance of space debris. 101 Although for policymakers space debris
is mainly a traffic management problem, international environmental law includes several sets of rules and principles that may affect decisions. Critically,
the international community must appreciate that any rules for mitigating
space debris must be balanced with the mitigation of another international
externality: greenhouse gas emissions.
The “polluter pays” principle has been suggested as an indication that
space-capable States should bear the brunt of the costs of mitigation efforts,
because they are responsible for most past and current debris. 102 Others have
raised the precautionary principle as a source of obligations, based on the
notion that States have a general obligation to “take preventive measures to
protect the environment.” 103 The core idea of this principle “is to prevent
environmental harm in advance, even when full scientific certainty about a
threat does not exist,” 104 thus imposing a preventative “due diligence” obligation depending on a State’s capabilities. 105 But, as Lotta Viikari explains,
the application of the precautionary principle under international law is challenging given that both its flexibility and generality are made worse in instances of scientific uncertainty and ambiguous risks. 106 With respect to

101. See, e.g., Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 490–91; Gordon
Chung, The Emergence of Environmental Protection Clauses in the Outer Space Treaty: A Lesson from
the Rio Principles, in A FRESH VIEW ON THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 11 (Annette Froehlich
ed., 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3188062; LOTTA
VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN SPACE LAW 175 (2008); Olavo de O. Bittencourt Neto, Preserving the Outer Space Environment: The “Precautionary Principle” Approach to Space
Debris, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 341 (2013);
Sophie Kaineg, The Growing Problem of Space Debris, 26 HASTINGS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
JOURNAL 277 (2019); STUBBE, supra note 10, at 164, 171; Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at
33.
102. Plantz, supra note 10, at 611, 617; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note
1, at 490–91; Kaineg, supra note 101, at 288; Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 49; Vishakha
Gupta, supra note 3, at 33.
103. Viikari, supra note 101, at 157; see also Neto, supra note 101, at 347–51; Chung, supra
note 101, at 11–13.
104. Viikari, supra note 101, at 159.
105. Id.; see also STUBBE, supra note 10, at 209.
106. Viikari, supra note 101, at 164–65.
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space debris, Viikari notes that applying the precautionary principle may require costly solutions, making its adoption “a complicated endeavor.” 107
Guidance may be found in the ILC’s draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. 108 The Articles establish a
due diligence obligation for States when approving activities which “involve
a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical consequences.” 109 The ILC explains that a “State likely to be affected” can be
more than one State and includes places under any State’s jurisdiction or
control. 110 Therefore, arguably, transboundary harm should, in principle, extend to include risks to space objects. While the ILC recognized that it “cannot forecast all possible future forms of ‘transboundary harm,’ ” 111 it did,
however, point out the need to distinguish between affected and affecting
States. 112 “[D]rawing a clear line,” as the ILC desires, may not be practical
for space debris as it affects all participants, including the State of origin,
whether immediately or in the future, subject to their adaptation capabilities.
Nevertheless, the ILC Articles signal the appreciation that States must
conduct an “assessment of transboundary harm” of a potentially harmful
activity prior to authorization, including “any environmental impact assessment.” 113 In 2015, the International Court of Justice recognized an “obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant transboundary environmental harm,” 114 with substantive obligations that resemble the Articles. 115
Both the ILC Articles and the International Court of Justice’s Construction
of a Road judgment impose obligations of conduct rather than of result with
respect to transboundary harm. In operative terms, States are only required
to notify and consult prior to authorizing hazardous activities, but are not

107. Id. at 175.
108. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 cmt. to art. 2, ¶ 11,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n cmt. to art. 2, ¶ 11,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC, ATH].
109. Id. art. 1; see also Dennerley, supra note 51, at 295.
110. ILC, ATH, supra note 108, cmt. to art. 2, ¶ 11.
111. Id. cmt. to art. 2, ¶ 9.
112. Id.
113. Id. art. 7.
114. Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa
Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16).
115. Id. ¶ 104; id. ¶ 19 (separate opinion by Donoghue, J.).
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prohibited from authorizing them. 116 Nevertheless, they are required to take
“all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at
any event to minimize the risk thereof,” 117 while considering “the importance
of the activity,” 118 “the availability of means of preventing,” 119 and the prospect of “carrying out the activity . . . by other means.” 120 The ILC also added
the need to consider “the standards of prevention . . . applied in comparable
regional or international practice.” 121 In the case of space debris, these may
extend to include the COPUOS guidelines.
Although it may be beneficial to have States perform environmental impact assessments when the risk may extend to the entire international community, the process requires actions directed at specific affected States.
While the ILC may be justified in extending the obligation to installations of
other States on the high seas, extending it to ships 122 that may be randomly
affected presents difficulties in implementation. The situation in space is
even more challenging because debris, once created, continues to exist in
orbit and is likely to affect future participants. The proposition that spacecapable States need not only take the interests of stakeholders into account,
but must also assess possible transboundary and future effects, or provide
notification and consultation to all States, is excessive and impractical given
the instability of risks and changing affected parties.
One caveat is important. In a forthcoming article, Professors Donald
Elliott and Daniel Esty propose to reconsider the theory of environmental
externalities, suggesting to shift governance towards the internalization of all
externalities, which they frame as an “end of externalities.” 123 According to
their approach, “all residual pollution that remains after the application of
technologically feasible pollution controls must bear a harm charge that
compensates as fully as is possible those subject to the ongoing emissions,”
in order to affect decisions towards “zero emissions goals.” 124 They recog-

116. ILC, ATH, supra note 108, arts. 8, 9.
117. Id. art. 3.
118. Id. art. 10(b).
119. Id. art. 10(c).
120. Id. art. 10(e).
121. Id. art. 10(f).
122. Id. cmt. to art. 2, ¶ 9.
123. E. Donald Elliot & Daniel C. Esty, The End of Environmental Externalities Manifesto:
A Rights-Based Foundation for Environmental Law, NYU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3762022.
124. Id. at 6.
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nize that “concessions to practicality and feasibility” will be required but suggest that technological innovation will reduce the tradeoffs. 125 Although their
approach is founded on individual harm and “a right to a healthy environment,” 126 which somewhat limits its application to a traffic management
problem such as space debris, should this approach be adopted as a guiding
principle of international environmental law, both the Articles of Transboundary Harm and the correlating obligations of States, will require reconsideration.
Even absent any mandatory assessment of transboundary harm, the ILC
Articles may indicate that any State planning space activities must consider
using available mitigation capabilities as a matter of principle. This should,
of course, be balanced with the potential level of harm and benefits of the
space activity, which, for many developing States, could be significant. Finally, any international regulation for the mitigation of space debris must
take account of, and be affected by, the international rules and principles
directed at the climate change crisis. These include, inter alia, the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities” 127 and the commitments in the
Paris Agreement to increase the mitigation of emissions. 128 Although space
debris is not an emission on its own, rules governing space debris mitigation
should facilitate, and be balanced with, the obligations to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and adapt to climate change. It is thus important to appreciate
that while space activities promote the ability of participants to adapt to and
mitigate the adverse effects of climate change, space launches generate significant emissions. 129 The urgency of adequately responding to the climate
change crisis, through both adaptation and mitigation, indicates that the international community must balance the costs and benefits of space activities
not only in the sense of debris but also in the sense of emissions.
Furthermore, in confronting climate change, space-based geoengineering efforts constitute an important instrument to achieving the public policy

125. Id. at 8.
126. Id. at 6
127. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.4, opened
for signature June 3, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
128. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
129. David Verbeek & Helene Fouquet, Can We Get to Space Without Damaging the Earth
Through Huge Carbon Emissions?, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.latimes.
com/business/story/2020-01-30/space-launch-carbon-emissions.
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objective. 130 Whether or not such endeavors are realized must also depend
on their potential impact on space debris. In correlation, the urgency of confronting climate change may justify the increased generation of debris. Space
debris mitigation would thus be affected by international rules and practices
concerning climate change.
ii. International Investment Law
International investment law governs the relations between States and foreign investors. It includes historical elements of public international law concerning diplomatic protection of nationals and minimum standards of treatment, human rights law, and a myriad of over three thousand investment
protection treaties. Although treaties may be formulated differently, the investment protection regime includes certain repeating themes intended to
promote and protect foreign investments. These elements include not only
substantiative protections for investors from measures adopted by hostStates but also procedural rights, ranging from access to domestic courts to
legally binding State consent to international arbitration. In broad terms,
these rules are intended to create favorable terms for cross-border investment and provide investors protections from political decisions taken by the
host-State to their detriment. 131 As private space activities gain momentum,
international investment law may play a part in the governance of any crossborder space-related investment.
The increase in private space activities risks instigating a circular international process of reduced regulatory burdens described as a “regulatory race
to the bottom.” 132 The possibility of this spiral effect stems from a potential
130. See Mark G. Lawrence et al., Evaluating Climate Geoengineering Proposals in the Context
of the Paris Agreement Temperature Goals, 9 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-05938-3.
131. On international investment law, see FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES,
MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 1–7 (R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford & W. Michael Reisman eds., 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES]; JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ch. 1 (2d ed. 2015); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ch. I (2d ed. 2012).
132. The risk of a regulatory race to the bottom has long been recognized in other
regulatory fields, primarily with respect to environmental law. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 570, 604, 627–38 (1996) (“The
knowledge that one’s competitors intend to lower or already have lowered environmental
standards induces parties to act preemptively or responsively and to lower their own standards, triggering a downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results.”).
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flag of convenience problem in outer space activities, 133 emulating an endemic problem in maritime shipping. 134 Space-incapable States may adopt
regulations to attract foreign investors as a means of participating in the new
Space Age. Such an approach was adopted in Luxemburg, which has successfully attracted foreign investors to establish domestic operations by following the United States in recognizing property rights to space resources, 135
a proposition disputed by others, including Russia. 136 Increased ability to disconnect from terrestrial domains enables space investors to shift their operations to a State that offers favorable terms, such as reduced labor costs, a
higher share of profits, and reduced safety and debris regulations to decrease
costs. Investors and potential host-States may be incentivized to increase the
generation of space debris in the short term, discounting potential future
costs associated with higher levels of debris in orbit. As many State participants have incentives to attract investors, this situation risks turning into that
regulatory race to the bottom.
It has been argued that international investment protection for space activities will encourage space investments in space-incapable States. 137 This
sensible assumption leads to the conclusion that the rights and protections
offered by investment treaties will exacerbate, indirectly, the problem of debris because (1) the investment protection system is widespread and mainly
founded on the bilateral model; 138 (2) the effects of debris in space, rather
than on the Earth, are subject to the supervision and fault-based liability of
States; and (3) in a flag of convenience situation, space activities may be governed under the laws of a State offering lenient regulations, while, in fact,
operating and being controlled from an entirely different location. With interactions occurring in these situations, the regulatory race to the bottom
may be fueled by the investment protection system.

133. Larsen, Minimum International Norms For Mitigating Space Traffic, supra note 4, at 754;
Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 515.
134. See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 89, at 168.
135. Weinzierl, supra note 79, at 189.
136. See Hasin, supra note 5, at 111.
137. See Peter Malanczuk, Investment Protection of Commercial Activities in Space: Treaties,
Contracts, Licenses, Insurance, Arbitration, 19 JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 951,
998–99 (2018); Ingo Baumann & Hussaine El Bajjati, NewSpace: A Wave of Private Investment
in Commercial Space Activities and Potential Issues Under International Investment Law, id. at 930,
942–50 (2018); Stephan Hobe et al., The Protection of Satellite Telecommunications Activities Under
Bilateral Investment Treaties, id. at 1024, 1025–27 (2018).
138. FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 131, at 8–11.
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Various protections offered by investment treaties, such as legitimate expectations or an agreement on regulatory stability, may impose hurdles on
developing States wishing to alleviate the international externality by increasing their regulatory requirements. Tribunals may disregard international considerations and limit themselves to the case at bar. 139 Thus, even if, from an
international perspective, increased debris mitigation standards are welcome,
a tribunal may still find a State in violation of an investment treaty. Although
it is unclear whether or how much of a “chilling effect” this may precipitate,
the possibility of such an effect indicates that international investment law
plays a part in any global efforts to mitigate space debris.
III.

PARTICIPANTS AND VALUES

Global governance for space debris mitigation must be attuned to the goals
and interests of the relevant participants: it must be feasible, effective, and
manageable. A regime’s feasibility can be measured by reference to the participants involved, their bases of power, objectives, and the outcomes of
their anticipated interactions in the specific circumstances. Effectiveness depends on a given regime’s ability to optimize the gain in values for all participants; manageability turns upon the situations in which the interactions transpire and upon the strategies the participants choose. 140
To properly evaluate any proposed rules and postulate the anticipated
evolution of the regime, this section outlines the international values participants will utilize and the regime must optimize, and then considers the relevant participants and their goals and interests as they relate to the optimization of values. Given the limited international rules in place, considering
the “responses of key actors to . . . critical event[s],” 141 as Reisman explained,
is essential for ascertaining the interactions that will develop the regime.
A. International Values
Although their content may evolve as space activities increase and global
governance responds and develops further, the currently relevant international values are (1) wealth, (2) skill or innovation, (3) equity, (4) security, (5)
139. See W. Michael Reisman¸ “Case Specific Mandates” versus “Systemic Implications”: How
Should Investment Tribunals Decide?, 29 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 131 (2013).
140. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text.
141. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS 5 (1988).
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health and safety, (6) human dignity, and (7) environmental protection. 142
This section will briefly review these values in relation to space debris.
1. Wealth
Outer space activities both require and generate wealth. Space capabilities
provide many advantages to States, including communication, geolocation,
espionage, military command and control, urban planning, medical research,
and more. 143 But developing space capabilities, either privately or publicly,
requires significant capital for the development and acquisition of expertise,
infrastructure construction, and personnel training. 144 In the past, the significant investment required, high risk, and minimal returns led to activities being funded primarily by governments for scientific knowledge, prestige, and
security. 145 This pattern is changing.
The satellite industry was privatized due to its ability to generate revenue. 146 Currently, the potential gains in wealth generate private investment
in other aspects of space activities, including tourism, launches, military, and,
perhaps, resources. 147 The anticipated gains in wealth drive decision-making
processes and, subsequently, the development of international law. In respect of space debris mitigation, anticipated interactions indicate that wealth
produces conflicting effects on policy choices.
142. These values are based on the New Haven School of International Law, but modified to modern interactions. See Hasin, supra note 5, at 116–17, 125; see also W. Michael
Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction,
32 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 575, 576 (2007); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & IVAN A. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE ch. 1 (1963).
143. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 41; Committee on the Peaceful Use of Space, Report on
the United Nations/Austria Symposium on the Theme “Space: a Tool for Accessibility, Diplomacy and
Cooperation,” U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1220 (Dec. 23, 2019); Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at
44–45.
144. See Doshi, supra note 48, at 201–2; see also Economic and Social Council, Exploring
Space Technologies for Sustainable Development and the Benefits of International Research Collaboration
in this Context, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.16/2020/3 (Jan. 13, 2020).
145. See STUBBE, supra note 10, at 41; President's Science Advisory Committee, Introduction to Outer Space, NASA (Mar. 26, 1958), https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/16.html;
HOBE, supra note 1, at 29–37; John M. Logsdon, Space Exploration, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/science/space-exploration (last visited Aug. 5, 2021); The
Space Race is Dominated by New Contenders, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.
economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/18/the-space-race-is-dominated-by-new-contenders.
146. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 37.
147. See Weinzierl, supra note 79.
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The implementation of mitigation efforts increases the costs of space
projects. Thus, any participant able to avoid or decrease their implementation of mitigation will potentially increase its gain in wealth. 148 A tragedy of
the commons ensues: each participant is incentivized to generate debris as
the externality’s effects spread between all participants. 149 But the adverse
effects of space debris on the costs associated with all participants’ access to
space, the safety of personnel, and protection of property, might offset gains
from reduced mitigation efforts. Therefore, the increased consequence for
major users generates incentives for them to self-mitigate. 150 Emerging State
and private participants may, however, discount future risk and prioritize
immediate gains, given their lower overall exposure to accidents.
Increased susceptibility to outliers, as with high seas fishing and climate
change, indicates that the manageability of any international regulation for
debris mitigation turns upon generating incentives for participants to moderate immediate gains in wealth in exchange for future ones. The effectiveness of any potential international regulation thus turns upon its ability to
command universality, which imposes difficulties on the feasibility due to
the need to achieve consensus.
2. Skill or Innovation
Wealth and innovation are interdependent. Wealth drives and enables innovation, and innovation generates wealth. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that for most space activities, the gap between space-capable and
space-incapable States could grow exponentially, as the former acquire more
wealth from providing services and accessing resources to fuel their private
and public innovation. 151 Coupled with the significant benefits of space activities, these prospects generate a strong incentive for emerging participants
to accelerate their development of space capabilities without concern for the
debris generated in the process.

148. See Viikari, supra note 101, at 175; Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 29; Weinzierl,
supra note 79, at 186–87.
149. Weinzierl, supra note 79; Plantz, supra note 10, at 604.
150. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 496; see, e.g., IADC Guidelines, supra note 3.
151. See, e.g., Doshi, supra note 48, at 199–200; Adam Xu, China Joins Race to Mine Moon
for Resources, VOA (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/science-health/china-joinsrace-mine-moon-resources.
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Innovation increases debris generation by certain participants, yet debris
mitigation is essential by and for all participants. Recently, SpaceX tested a
launcher that landed back on the Earth rather than burning up in the atmosphere or remaining in orbit. 152 Similarly, other technological developments
to reduce debris have been developed and adopted, as States implement the
guidelines. 153 Policymakers must also appreciate the fact that innovation,
through identification, tracking, and protection from debris, allows participants to adapt to the externality and reduce the cost-effectiveness of mitigation. But by reducing some participants’ need for mitigation, innovation may
undermine the goals and interests of other participants.
States may be incentivized to invest in innovation to enable and protect
their operations to increase domestic gain in all values. Investors, however,
will invest in mitigation and adaptation technology only as far as it corresponds with gains in wealth. For investors, predictability is essential. Thus,
any global regime must secure, to a reasonable extent, investors’ ability to
innovate and protect their investments. Unclear and changing rules on debris
mitigation may disincentivize investors, while strict rules limiting innovation
risk incentivizing the relocation of space operations to less stringent jurisdictions, thereby promoting outlier decisions for both States and investors.
3. Equity
Claims of equity come from all types of participants but predominantly from
developing countries. Such claims affect the development of international
law. Myres McDougal and his co-authors emphasized that “space resources
could serve . . . as a great ‘equalizer’ between different territorial communities.” 154 But for space and its resources to truly “equalize” communities, a
regime must be attuned to the goals and interests of all participants, including
equity claims. Although items of space debris are not “resources” in the common sense, the increase in debris undermines the capability of participants
to use all other resources of space, including valuable orbits. 155

152. Recent Launch, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/launches/ (last visited Aug. 5,
2021).
153. Joana Ramos Ribeiro et al., Evolution of Policies and Technologies for Space Debris Mitigation Based on Bibliometric and Patent Analyses, 44 SPACE POLICY 40 (2018).
154. Myres S. McDougal et al., The Enjoyment and Acquisition of Resources in Outer Space,
111 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 521, 540 (1963).
155. See Salter, supra note 1, at 227–28.
1101

International Law Studies

2021

Claims for equity in debris mitigation and adaptation rest on the fact that
most existing debris originates from activities conducted by space-capable
States in the process of developing their skills. 156 But space-incapable States
wishing to develop their own skills and industries will have to resist rules that
increase their debris mitigation obligations to a level that undermines their
ability to develop space capabilities. 157 Equity claims, therefore, include calls
to prescribe for an equitable distribution of responsibility for mitigating the
space debris problem while preserving the ability of participants to increase
debris for the development of domestic industries. 158 For any international
rules to command the universality required to reduce outlier behavior, the
regime must implement elements of equity, which may take the form of common but differentiated responsibilities, either internationally or through national discretion.
In the past, developing countries have combined claims for equity with
requests for technology sharing and financial assistance. The development
of the law of the sea demonstrates that if such claims are directed at imposing
preconditions on access to natural resources, they are likely to face significant
opposition. 159 However, were such claims limited to mitigation and adaptation capabilities, they may be acceptable to developed States, as evident from
the compromises reached in the efforts to confront climate change. 160
Space-capable States may be more receptive to calls for sharing mitigation technology rather than adaptation technology, which may also have military and security aspects. It is worth recalling that domestic and international
regulations impose costs on participants, thus encouraging the investment
of capital for developing cost-reducing technological solutions. If all partici-

210.

156. Id. at 224–25; Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 47–48; STUBBE, supra note 10, at

157. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report on the Work of Its SixtySecond Session, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (2019) [hereinafter COPUOS Report].
158. Id. ¶¶ 121–24.
159. As a point of reference, the UNCLOS rules governing the regulation of the Area,
and specifically the technology sharing obligation, were seriously opposed by developed
States, which led to their amendment by the 1994 Implementation Agreement. See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 89, at 18–19. In a similar sense, the Moon Treaty has been
rejected by space-capable States due to its common heritage elements. See von der Dunk,
Asteroid Mining, supra note 42, at 89–90; see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381
(Apr. 10, 2020)
160. What is Technology Development and Transfer?, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-technology/the-big-picture/what-is-technology-development-and-transfer (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
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pants shared and implemented mitigation technologies, the demand for further technological innovation would be reduced. Investors, however, are unlikely to be enthusiastic about sharing cost-reducing technology.
4. Security
National security infrastructures of many States, predominantly space-capable States, rely heavily on space activities. These security interests will be
jeopardized should the rate of debris generation exceed States’ adaptation
capabilities, thus increasing the potential for accidents. This equilibrium
would affect less developed participants more than developed ones due to
their different abilities to employ wealth and innovation. The increased adaptation capabilities of space-capable States indicate that security-related
claims will only marginally affect the development of international law at the
initial stage. But they will take an increasingly central role if debris proliferation exceeds their adaptation capabilities.
The proliferation of space debris not only threatens to adversely affect
security interests but may precipitate conflict due to increased accidents and
associated costs. The limited ability to prove fault or responsibility constitutes an obvious caveat to such a proposition, undermining the prospect of
any tangible disputes stemming from debris, and especially very small fragments. The crash of the Soviet satellite in Canada was settled without dispute, 161 and while the testing of anti-satellite weapons by China and India has
generated protest, 162 it did not culminate in international disputes. However,
there is no guarantee that space debris will not generate disputes in the future
that jeopardize security.
Increased private activities may further escalate security concerns given
the reduced ability of States to exercise control. In addition, the current assignment of jurisdiction and responsibility indicates that disputes over damage between investors, and perhaps between investors and States, may become international if and when insurance no longer provides adequate protection. 163 As will be further elaborated below, the allocation of jurisdiction,
161. Roth, supra note 75, at 845–46.
162. SHIRLEY KAN, CONG. RCSH. SERV., RS22652, CHINA’S ANTI-SATELLITE
WEAPON TEST 1–2 (2007); Helen Regan, India Anti-Satellite Missile Test a “Terrible Thing,”
NASA Chief Says, CNN (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/india/nasaindia-anti-missile-test-intl/index.html.
163. See Salter, supra note 1, at 230–32; Paul B. Larsen, Does New Space Require New
Liability Laws?, 68 GERMAN JOURNAL OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 196, 223–24 (2019).
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responsibility, and liability under the current international rules is somewhat
inappropriate given the current and anticipated interactions. The potential
engagement at the inter-State level may further generate claims to alter such
rules either through modification or interpretation.
5. Health and Safety
All claims for increased mitigation rest upon the need to protect the safety
of space crews and property. Accidents may bring about increased adverse
effects on health, especially should radioactive components be damaged. 164
Furthermore, health is promoted through space activities, such as medical
research, remote sensing, environmental efforts, and more. 165 Allowing accidents to undermine these vital space capabilities would adversely affect
health and safety on the ground as well.
On the other hand, while debris mitigation is primarily intended to promote safety and health, overly strict mitigation rules could discourage space
activities meant to promote domestic gains in these values. Therefore, the
global regime must balance the risks to health and safety in space with domestic benefits in health and safety from increased space activities.
6. Human Dignity
For any global debris mitigation regime to attain universality it should promote human dignity as well as equity. This means that in addition to promoting the human rights of space personnel and terrestrial employees, universality will turn on a regime’s ability to win wide participation in both its
foundation and implementation, rather than being dictated by certain participants. “An instrumental goal of a public order of human dignity is of course
the equipping of all individuals for full participation in authoritative decision.” 166 Such claims may be supplemented by claims to prevent a democratic deficit from top-down international regulation. 167
The regime’s foundation must extend to include as many participants in
the decision-making process as is feasible. The increased prospects of outlier
behavior indicate that international command and control is neither feasible
164. See Button, supra note 3, at 545.
165. See Overview of ISS Research Benefits to Human Health, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/
mission_pages/station/research/benefits/human_health.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
166. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 11, at 256.
167. See generally BENVENISTI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 80, chs. I, II.
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nor advisable, and the prospects for convening a parliamentary diplomatic
arena to produce an instrument by majority vote are quite low. Rather, any
international regime must be based on cooperation, be adopted by consensus, recognize and appreciate participants’ specific goals and interests, and
be dynamic in allowing them to optimize domestic and international values.
7. Environmental Protection
As mentioned above, the promotion of environmental protection may conflict with debris mitigation, as outer space activities provide essential tools
for combating domestic environmental concerns and their adverse effects,
primarily climate change and natural disasters. 168 It is, therefore, essential to
recognize that promoting such objectives may outweigh the adverse effects
of increased space debris and its associated costs. International rules must
balance the need to protect the Earth’s environment and ensure the viability
of space operations.
B. Participants
Modern global governance presents increased complexity and a multiplicity
of participants. As far as the regulation of space debris is concerned, States
continue to play a central role, but the participation of private and publicprivate entities is gaining momentum. 169 This section will review the various
participants involved in the process of shaping international rules for space
debris mitigation, their goals, and interests.
1. Space-Capable States
International rules governing the mitigation of space debris will be predominantly shaped through the interactions of space-capable States and thus will
be attuned to their goals and interests. These participants are, and will likely
remain, the major military and economic powers. Although the centrality of

168. See Benefits of Space: Environment, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
https://unoosa.org/oosa/en/benefits-of-space/environment.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2021); Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation, OECD Space Forum, Space
Technologies and Climate Change, OECD (Aug. 2014), https://www.oecd.org/futures/spacetechnologies-and-climate-change.pdf.
169. Weinzierl, supra note 79, at 177–80.
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their goals and interests for the feasibility of any global order is self-evident, 170 their interests are contradictory, making the governance of space debris complex for these States.
Most space debris production originates from activities conducted by
space-capable States, predominantly the United States and Russia. 171 Besides
space operations, in recent years the testing of anti-satellite weapons has
emerged as a source for space debris. Weapons testing by China and India
disseminated large quantities of small but dangerous pieces of debris, 172 and
recently the United States criticized Russia for conducting a “non-destructive” anti-satellite weapons test in orbit. 173 The international criticism of
China’s anti-satellite weapons test did not discourage India from executing
its own test, indicating that other participants may develop and test such
weapons to counterbalance these States.
The evolution of the regime governing the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons 174 may assist in assessing the likely trajectory for global governance of anti-satellite weapons testing. Like atmospheric testing, the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space produces significant adverse economic,
medical, and environmental effects on the rights and interests of other participants. But the prohibition on atmospheric testing only emerged after the
major participants acquired the necessary capabilities through testing. Even
then, the prohibition was drafted in a manner that allowed a participant to
deviate from the regime on short notice. 175 Although the International Court
of Justice attempted to impose the prohibition on France, a non-Party to the
1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 176 it eventually backed down due to both
France’s refusal to abide by its preliminary injunction and its statement that
it would discontinue atmospheric testing, “in the normal course of
170. See, e.g., Plantz, supra note 10, at 612; Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 29; Salter,
supra note 1, at 232–33; Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 257.
171. Salter, supra note 1, at 224–25.
172. Kan, supra note 162, at 2–3; Salter, supra note 1, at 224; Yu Jiang, Debris Cloud of
India Anti-Satellite Test to Microsat-R Satellite, 6 HILIYON (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844020315358.
173. Russia Conducts Space-Based Anti-Satellite Weapons Test, UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND (July 23, 2020), https://www.spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2285098/russia-conducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-test/.
174. W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 46–71 (2004).
175. Id.
176. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Interim Protection Order, 1973 I.C.J. 99, 106 (June
22).
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events.” 177 It is thus reasonable to conclude that while the testing of antisatellite weapons generates adverse effects, the consent of major powers to
halting such tests is improbable until those powers perfect their capabilities.
It is interesting, however, to ponder whether, at such a time, a conditional
prohibition may be installed due to the adverse effects of debris generation.
With the vast majority of space activities in the near future conducted by
space-capable States and their citizens, they arguably bear the heaviest exposure to the costs associated with increased space debris. 178 But this proposition is over simplified. Given the importance of outer space to their security
and economy, these States have much to lose from the proliferation of space
debris. But they also possess vast wealth and innovation capabilities, increasing their capacity to adapt to adverse effects short of total devastation, the
timetables and potential of which are unclear. Thus, their potential risk is
offset by increased skills.
Still, space-capable States realize the potential adverse effects of space
debris on their interests, as is evident from the adoption of the IADC guidelines 179 and their internalization through domestic law. 180 But the inconsistency in application and compliance implies that other interests affect policy choices. Space-capable States are anticipated to continue promoting the
development of economically viable private or public space industries. 181
Thus, for them, any rules on debris mitigation must refrain from undermining such objectives. The Artemis Accords, 182 for instance, illustrate that
space-capable States prefer to coordinate the development of the space industry and debris mitigation between themselves through consortiums rather
than on an international scale. However, because space-capable States have
177. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶¶ 23–60 (Dec. 20); W.
Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAL MEETING 101, 117–19 (1981).
178. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 496; Muñoz-Patchen, supra
note 28, at 257; Weinzierl, supra note 79, at 177–78.
179. See SPD-3, supra note 3.
180. See, e.g., id.; see also Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 241.
181. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump is Reforming and Modernizing American
Commercial Space Policy, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 24, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-reforming-modernizing-american-commercial-space-policy/ [hereinafter U.S. Space Policy Directive 2]; INNOVATION FINANCE ADVISORY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SPACE SECTOR
(Report prepared for the European Commission, 2018), https://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/future_of_european_space_sector_summary_en.pdf.
182. Artemis Accords, supra note 29.
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different levels of industrial development and capabilities to avoid debris, 183
their interests may vary accordingly.
In addition, increased private participation in space activities may incentivize space-capable States to settle questions of liability and responsibility,
propelling the establishment of an international dispute resolution mechanism to increase foreseeability. 184 Besides safeguarding investments, as space
tourism increases, space-capable States will also aspire to install rules which
increase the protection of their populations from potential accidents. As
public entities, space-capable States may also promote debris mitigation as
an environmental concern due to public or political pressure.
2. Space-Incapable States and States Developing Capabilities
Although States currently lacking space capabilities and those actively developing space-capabilities may have varied goals, interests, and leverages, their
similarities justify treating them as a single group: space-incapable States. As
with space-capable States, these participants possess similar interests concerning the protection of their populations and the environment but have
different interests relating to the imposition of debris mitigation obligations.
As evident from recent discussions at the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, space-incapable States aspire to install a
regime of common but differentiated responsibilities for the mitigation of
space debris. 185 This claim of equity is based on three elements: (1) these
participants are not responsible for the debris generated thus far by spacecapable States; (2) imposing strict rules would undermine their capability to
develop their own space industries and gain the associated benefits in other
values; and (3) as they possess less developed adaptation capabilities, debris
proliferation presents higher risks for them than for space-capable States. 186
This echoes a well-known conundrum from global efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. 187 Although this article will further develop the analogy
183. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Space Traffic Management: A Challenge of Cosmic Proportions,
in 58TH IISL COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 385, 391 (2015); Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis,
supra note 1, at 482, 496; SPD-3, supra note 3.
184. On problems in the current regime of liability, see Larsen, Does New Space Require
New Liability Laws?, supra note 163.
185. COPUOS Report, supra note 157, ¶¶ 122–23.
186. See Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 47.
187. See Kurt, supra note 8, at 320.
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later, 188 it is important for purposes of this section to realize the conflicting
and complex interests of space-incapable States regarding space debris mitigation efforts.
The development of space capabilities is essential for developing countries 189 as it promotes wealth and innovation from public and private endeavors. 190 Moreover, because developing countries are disproportionately exposed to the adverse effects of climate change, 191 the benefits in mitigation
and adaptation offered through space technology 192 promote domestic environmental interests, health, safety, and wealth. The significant gain in values
for space-incapable States that stems from developing a space industry will
be counterbalanced by international values and the potential risks to their
domestic values from increased costs associated with debris.
Thus, space-incapable States aspire to install a regime that enables their
development of space capabilities while limiting the generation of debris by
current space-capable States. Some space-incapable States may, however,
prioritize short-term gains over future costs resulting in higher levels of debris generation. 193 Although less likely at this point in time, accidents could
lead to setbacks with dire results for these States due to their limited resources. 194 Therefore, emerging participants with reduced abilities to develop
their own space capabilities are likely to attract space investors through regulatory benefits. As such, given the likelihood that high levels of debris will
be generated in developing their space industries, emerging participants have
an interest in retaining the nationally based, non-legally binding structure of
the international order and the limited regime of liability. However, the more
capabilities a State acquires, the more it will appreciate the risks posed by
space debris.
188. See infra Part V.
189. G.A. Res. 74/82, supra note 3; Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 44–45.
190. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 41.
191. Paritosh Kasotia, The Health Effects of Global Warming: Developing Countries Are the
Most Vulnerable, UN CHRONICLE, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/health-effects-global-warming-developing-countries-are-most-vulnerable (last visited Aug. 5, 2021);
Climate Change and the Developing World: A Disproportionate Impact, U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
COALITION (Mar. 2020), https://www.usglc.org/blog/climate-change-and-the-developingworld-a-disproportionate-impact/.
192. Space and Climate Change, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, https://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-and-climate-change.html (last visited
Aug. 5, 2021).
193. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 515.
194. Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 47.
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In contrast to the case of space-resources, 195 space-incapable States possess certain leverage vis-à-vis space-capable States with respect to debris mitigation. An increasing number of States, including developing countries, currently have, or are developing, capabilities to launch satellites to the various
Earth orbits. 196 In addition, allocating territory for the construction of a
launching facility by a foreign investor requires little effort or technical expertise. Because space-incapable States can increase the externality with
which the mitigation regime is concerned, their interests and goals will restrain the regime’s evolution.
3. Investors
Space entrepreneurs not only generate space debris but also affect the policy
choices of States. As the case of space resources demonstrated, investors can
influence legislation adopted by their States. 197 With private activities lying at
the core of the United States’ future space policy and strategy, 198 the interests
of private industry will likely sound in both its policy choices and in any
international rules to be agreed upon.
Investors will likely lay claims to maximize their gain in wealth and innovation at the expense of environmental protection, equity, health, and security. They will lobby for international rules which maximize their ability to
conduct space operations at minimal costs. Some have suggested that given
the potential risks to their operations, investors would be incentivized to
come together to agree upon rules to mitigate debris. 199 It has even been
argued that private regulation of debris generation might be successful, and
no international governance is required. 200 Such proposals, however, assume
that private activities are transparent, and thus an outlier may not free-ride

195. See Hasin, supra note 5, Section IV(C).
196. COMPETING IN SPACE, NASIC (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/
16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.pdf; John Polansky & Mengu Cho, Classification of Countries Worldwide According to Satellite Activity Level, 14 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
JAPAN SOCIETY FOR AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY
JAPAN 7 (2016).
197. See von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining, supra note 42, at 94.
198. U.S. Space Policy Directive 2, supra note 181.
199. Kurt, supra note 8, at 334; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 508–
11.
200. See e.g. Kurt, supra note 8, at 334; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1,
at 508–11.
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the system while maximizing short-term gains in wealth. In any event, investors will only endorse mitigation efforts up to a level that affects their profitability.
To a certain degree, public pressure affects the decision-making process
of corporations. Therefore, investors may be motivated to sustain additional
debris mitigation costs should the public express concern over debris proliferation. This is evident from climate change efforts, where corporations take
mitigation efforts, attributed, inter alia, to efforts at increasing profitability
through public perception. 201 It is reasonable to conclude that as space tourism increases, two sets of incentives for mitigation may develop for investors: (1) collisions may become a business liability and (2) assuming public
opinion favors debris mitigation, being a “green” or “nonpolluting” provider
may become marketable to attract environmentally conscientious consumers.
Finally, claims by investors in respect of liability are affected by the feasibility of insurance to properly compensate for losses. Specifically, if risk
increases and insurance premiums rise so as to no longer provide sustainable
protection, 202 corporations may lobby States for increased mitigation rules,
press for strict liability with caps to enable cost-effective insurance, and favor
the installment of dispute settlement mechanisms to offset such costs. 203
Furthermore, investors will aspire to retain the protections found in investment treaties and extend their application to outer space activities. While
some investors will promote debris mitigation rules that protect the health
and safety of their crews and equipment, they will likely object to rules that
undermine their gains in wealth and innovation. The equilibrium for their
interests swings significantly towards wealth and innovation at the expense
of other values but will likely be capped through public pressure. Any domestic or international governance regimes should therefore put in place incentives to counterbalance such goals to optimize environmental protection,
equity, health, and security.

201. DANIEL ESTY & ANDREW WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD 7–29 (2009).
202. Some insurers have recently withdrawn from the space insurance business. See
Julien Cantegreil, The Building of Space Environment, in ARBITRATION BEYOND BORDERS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GUILLERMO AGUILAR ALVAREZ 15 (W. Michael Reisman & Nigel
Blackaby eds.) (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript on file with author).
203. On dispute settlement, see Larsen, Does New Space Require New Liability Laws?, supra
note 163, at 223–24; Salter, supra note 1, at 230–32.
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4. International Organizations – Public and Private
International organizations, public and private, form an integral part of
global governance, affecting the development of any regime for space debris
mitigation. These participants may be divided into three groups: (1) the
United Nations system; (2) intergovernmental organizations, formal and informal; and (3) non-governmental organizations.
The United Nations system includes various participants with distinct
interests and powers. On the one hand, the space-incapable States dominate
the General Assembly, but its mandate is budgetary and declaratory. While
General Assembly decisions may affect the development of opinio juris, they
are not legally binding. In contrast, the Security Council, which can issue
legally binding decisions, is dominated by space-capable States with veto
power. The selection process for the Secretary-General also indicates that
the Secretariat is likely to be more attuned to the interests of space-capable
States. 204
An upsurge in space debris may adversely affect the security of spacecapable States. 205 It is thus reasonable to conclude that at some point, unless
mitigation efforts are successful, space debris may come to be characterized
as a “threat to the peace.” 206 The powers of the Security Council have been
interpreted in the past to include indirect threats to peace under its mandate. 207 But in its belated response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Council
only called for a universal cease-fire in countries where there was an ongoing
armed conflict. 208 This may signal a retreat to a restrictive interpretation of
the Council’s constituent instrument. 209

204. Appointment Process, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, https://www.un.
org/sg/en/appointment.shtml (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
205. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 41.
206. U.N. Charter art. 39.
207. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1308 (July 17, 2000).
208. S.C. Res. 2532, ¶ 2 (July 1, 2020).
209. On dynamic interpretation of constituent instruments by international organizations, see MAHNOUSH H. ARSANJANI, RAPPORTEUR, INSTITUTE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 7TH COMMISSION, ARE THERE LIMITS TO THE DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE INTERNAL ORGANS OF SUCH ORGANIZATIONS (WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE UN SYSTEM)?, https://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Commission-7-Interpretation-constitution-of-international-organizations-Arsanjani-Travaux-La-Haye-2019.pdf (last visited
Aug. 5, 2021) [hereinafter ARSANJANI, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION].
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Nevertheless, facing clear security risks, space-capable States may be inclined to use their power through the Council to mandate mitigation rules,
counterbalancing the risk of a regulatory race to the bottom. But as spacecapable States enjoy significant traffic management capabilities, the tipping
point for such action may be higher than that which would impair the activities of States developing space capabilities. It is therefore important to consider how the General Assembly and other organs may respond to an increase in space debris.
It is doubtful whether space-incapable States could successfully act
through the General Assembly based on the Uniting for Peace precedent.
Under this precedent, the General Assembly may act when the Security
Council is deadlocked and failing to perform its function. 210 This model’s
pretension to demonstrate a superiority of the General Assembly over the
Security Council is, as Reisman explained, an illusion:
The effective powers in the Security Council, the United States and the
Soviet Union, were joined in opposition to France and the United Kingdom and used the Assembly or, if one prefers, enabled it, by their support,
to employ Uniting for Peace in ways that otherwise could not have been
used. 211

The similarity of interests and incentives between the space-capable States
indicates that a repeat occurrence is improbable, and the effectiveness of a
General Assembly resolution based on this precedent would crumble absent
similar support.
Assuming that the Security Council mandates certain rules, it is interesting to contemplate the possibility of an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly undermining the legally binding nature of such rules. The
General Assembly may, arguendo, request a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice. The Lockerbie case, although dismissed, introduced
the proposition of an International Court of Justice judicial review of Chapter VII resolutions. 212 Whether the measures mandated by the Council could
be considered ultra vires would depend more on the specific measure rather

210. Id. at 123–29.
211. W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 84 n.2 (1993).
212. See Michael J. Matheson, ICJ Review of Security Council Decisions, 36 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 615 (2004).
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than on the justification. Any overwhelming resolution of the General Assembly may tempt the court to address the question in an advisory opinion.
But as such fictional rules would exhibit the consensus of the most powerful
participants, they would significantly affect policy choices irrespective of the
court’s opinion.
Besides the Charter organs, other bodies, such as COPUOS, may provide a forum for discussions or decision-making. However, since any decision requires consensus, it would reflect the same balance of power. Nevertheless, given the ongoing discussions on debris in COPUOS, the transparency of the proceedings along with their publicity may affect public opinion
and encourage compromises. Other international organizations may also
participate in their specific fields of interest, such as health (the World Health
Organization), labor (the International Labour Organization), or financing
development (the World Bank Group).
Formal and informal intergovernmental organizations could affect the
regime’s evolution. The IADC influenced the voluntary guidelines for debris
mitigation adopted by COPUOS and subsequently internalized by States.
Other forums concluded between space-capable States, if such are established through a development of the Artemis Accords, may further coordinate their efforts and affect decisions. But other international organizations,
such as those associated with climate change mitigation, may promote geoengineering efforts through space activities, which could exacerbate the debris problem. Since space capabilities augment efforts to confront climate
change, an incentive exists for such organizations to discount the risks of
debris generation.
As with other aspects of human activity that exhibit either perceived or
real environmental effects, efforts to mitigate space debris may be supported
through non-governmental organizations. 213 These may include public-private partnerships whose objectives combine both those of investors and the
specific State-parties. Although their effects on the formulation of any constituent instruments may be limited and may depend on their composition,
public-private partnerships may promote the manageability of the global
rules by increasing transparency. 214

213. See, e.g., Cantegreil, supra note 202, at 21.
214. See BENVENISTI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 80, ch. II.
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EVALUATION OF PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

International policymakers, lawyers, and scholars have proposed various avenues through which international law could affect the policy choices of participants concerning the mitigation and removal of space debris. Proposals
can be divided into two categories: (1) self-enforcing regulations by private
and public entities and (2) international command and control regimes. This
section will outline certain characteristics of the proposed structures and
then evaluate their feasibility, effectiveness, and manageability.
A. Self-enforcing Regulations
Some scholars suggest that global governance for space debris mitigation
could rely on independent decision-making by States or the private sector. 215
Such an approach follows two rationales: (1) the decline of multilateralism
signals low prospects for negotiating another treaty 216 and (2) because both
space-capable States and private industry suffer adverse effects from space
debris, they have an incentive to cooperate and adopt mitigation policies.
Corporations, it is argued, could successfully reduce debris through coordination and best practices, 217 and space-capable States could follow the IADC
scheme to further coordinate their efforts on a semi-multilateral basis. 218
Such coordination, it is proposed, may even become legally binding and encourage others to join. 219
But non-legally binding regulation, although feasible, entails risks and
limitations for its effectiveness and manageability. These proposals oversimplify the incentives of States and investors. As far as investors are concerned,
as Paul B. Larsen explains, “Past experiences with the private sector regulating safety obstacles to their operation have proven problematic.” 220 As he
points out, their “motivation for competition and profit conflicts with and
215. See, e.g., Kurt, supra note 8, at 334; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note
1, at 496–99, 508–11; Steven A. Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives
to a Legally Binding Instrument, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 649 (2005);
Popova & Schaus, supra note 10.
216. Salter, supra note 1, at 232–33; see also Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 92.
217. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 508–11; Kurt, supra note 8,
at 334.
218. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 514–17.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 510.
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is sometimes stronger than their motivation for safety,” 221 but such motivation is counterbalanced by public opinion and economic considerations. 222
Furthermore, lack of universality and enforcement generates incentives for
outlier behavior, prioritizing short-term gains in wealth over future risks to
health and safety. 223
As an analogy, in confronting climate change, corporations have endeavored to mitigate emissions in response to public pressure or gain a future
advantage. 224 Yet, such a process is less common where high polluters are
concerned. 225 For the latter, short-term profits are prioritized over potential
long-term competitive advantages from developing emission-reducing technologies. 226 Although debris increases costs for space investors, some may
prefer guaranteed short-term gains in wealth, discounting both future risks
to their business module and environmental concerns. It should further be
noted that it took time until public pressure was successfully applied to confront the climate crisis, and it is far from certain when, or even if, such pressure may be exhibited in relation to space debris.
With respect to the capacity of the private sector to self-regulate an externality, high seas fishing is a good example of a common resource and the
effects on corporate decision-making. 227 Absent a monopoly or strict regulations, 228 each participant is incentivized to grab more of the resource in
question, thus depleting the resource and increasing the externality for all
participants. 229 While stark differences exist between the proliferation of
221. Id. at 511.
222. See, e.g., ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 201, at 7–29.
223. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 515.
224. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Center for Corporate Climate Leadership,
GHG Reduction Programs & Strategies, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/centercorporate-climate-leadership-ghg-reduction-programs-strategies (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
See also Matthias J. Pickl, The Renewable Energy Strategies of Oil Majors – From Oil to Energy?, 26
ENERGY STRATEGY REVIEW 1 (2019).
225. See, e.g., David Shepardson, Several Automakers Back Trump in Two Other California
Vehicle Emissions Suits, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autosemissions-california/several-automakers-back-trump-in-two-other-california-vehicle-emissions-suits-idUSKBN1XB33K.
226. For a possible change, see Our Path to an All-Electric Future, GM, https://
www.gm.com/electric-vehicles.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2021).
227. See Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundation of the Law of the Sea, 104
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 571–77 (2009) [hereinafter Posner &
Sykes, Law of the Sea].
228. Id. at 595–96.
229. Id. at 571–72.
1116

Confronting Space Debris

Vol. 97

space debris and high seas fishing, 230 such processes seem to be echoed in
the decisions made by private entities engaging in space ventures. One example is the launch of a Tesla into space; 231 another is SpaceX’s “Starlink”
project which generated concerns for space debris and led the European
Space Agency to maneuver one of its satellites to avoid a collision. 232 While
these are only anecdotal examples, they illustrate that for a private participant, the potential benefit in wealth and innovation offsets any aggregated
adverse effects from the externality shared by all stakeholders.
The potential for States to counterbalance investors must not be overestimated and needs to account for each State’s specific interests, goals, and
adaptation capabilities. For instance, for the United States, given its debrisavoiding capabilities, a higher debris generation rate may be acceptable to
promote its objective to develop private space capabilities. Although such an
approach may not be shared by Russia and China, as long as their focus
remains on public activities, these participants may continue to increase debris through weapons testing.
The incentives of individual space-capable States and private entities are
complex and may not be geared towards effective mitigation of debris. The
challenge is exacerbated by the realization that the incentives of space-capable States to rein-in investors provide space-incapable States with the opportunity to capitalize on the investors’ motivation to generate more wealth,
which may lead to reduced efforts by all States in a regulatory race to the
bottom. Thus, reliance upon private regulation or diffused regulation by
space-capable States risks becoming ineffective and unmanageable vis-à-vis
outliers.

230. Fish are a resource while debris is a byproduct, and high seas fishing is governed,
albeit unsuccessfully, on a regional basis.
231. Kevin McKenna, We’ve Trashed the Oceans; Now We are Turning Space Into a Junkyard
for Billionaires, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/11/weve-trashed-oceans-now-turning-space-into-junkyard-for-billionaireselon-musk-tesla.
232. Jonathan O'Callaghan, SpaceX’s Starlink Could Cause Cascades of Space Junk, SCIENTIFIC AMERICA (May 13, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/spacexs-starlink-could-cause-cascades-of-space-junk/; Jeff Foust, ESA Spacecraft Dodges Potential Collision
with Starlink Satellite, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 2, 2019), https://spacenews.com/esa-spacecraftdodges-potential-collision-with-starlink-satellite/.
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B. International Command and Control
Some scholars and commentators propose to sway policy choices towards
the mitigation of space debris through legally binding international regimes.
The proposed regimes vary and include elements such as international organizations, binding standards, financial contributions, fees, verification
methods, and dispute settlement. 233 Although varying in form, proposals
seek to affect policy choices through (1) uniform international standards for
debris mitigation (preferably legally binding) while (2) incorporating certain
financial instruments to encourage behavior or provide compensation.
These two elements usually coexist with many proposals incorporating economic and standardization elements. But a review of these proposals reveals
an inherent flaw.
Most scholarship on outer space regulation in general, and space debris
in particular, fails to appreciate that instruments of global governance develop through the international lawmaking process. The predominant approach can be labeled “regime transplantation,” predicated on the assumption that if a certain international regime successfully confronted an externality, it could be adopted, mutatis mutandis, to confront another externality;
in this case, space debris. This approach fails to consider the underlying policy-related attributes of the externality concerned. It overlooks the fact that
an international regime reflects outcomes of certain interactions, between
certain participants, with certain interests, capabilities, and leverages, addressing a certain externality, under certain circumstances, at a certain point
in time. These attributes illustrate the case-specific, sui generis nature of each
international regime and the arbitrariness of attempting to imprint an outcome
on an entirely distinct set of interactions.
Recognizing the sui generis character of international regimes does not
exclude the benefits that a review of existing global governance could provide to regulatory proposals. Far from it. But it does indicate that an appropriate evaluation must consider the interactions which led to specific regimes
and whether similar or different interactions are anticipated to occur with

233. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 503–8, 518; Ferreira-Snyman,
supra note 6, at 48–50; V. Gopalakrishman & M. Prases, Space Debris Remediation – Common
but Differentiated Responsibility, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
SPACE LAW 379, 391–92 (2013); Plantz, supra note 10, at 608–18; Vishakha Gupta, supra
note 3, at 35–37; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 445; Jakhu, Nyampong & Sgobba, supra note 28;
Button, supra note 3; Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 255–57.
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respect to a given externality, rather than attempting to transplant the outcomes of those interactions.
1. Uniform International Standards
Many authors lament the fact that the COPUOS guidelines are neither universal, specific, nor legally binding. 234 The recommendatory and broad language of the guidelines leads to each State setting its own rules or standards
rather than to uniform international standards. This produces different degrees of compliance, and failure to implement does not constitute an internationally wrongful act. This propelled commentators to suggest that uniform international standards for debris mitigation must be accepted, preferably as legally binding rules. 235 Such rules would ease verification of compliance but entail the abrogation of sovereign discretion. As this section will
explain, the different characteristics of space debris hardly justify the political
costs and compromises associated with installing such standards through negotiations and their subsequent enforcement.
Reviewing the situations in which the international community saw it
necessary and appropriate to install uniform international standards reveals
completely different settings. States have consented to uniform international
standards to ameliorate and facilitate international externalities of activities
that are inherently transboundary in nature and engage the jurisdiction of
random participants.
Participants installed uniform international standards and complied with
them to alleviate conflicting sovereign jurisdictional interactions. Improving
the mitigation of particular externalities was not a motivation. Activities generating space debris, however, remain subject only to the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of specific States.
Universal standards for safety exist in various fields, such as for products
through the International Organization for Standardization (non-legally
binding but widely accepted), 236 shipping under the International Maritime
234. See, e.g., Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 499–500; FerreiraSnyman, supra note 6, at 30; Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 93; Plantz, supra note 10, at 587–
88.
235. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 503–6, 518; Vishakha Gupta,
supra note 3, at 35–37; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 451.
236. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 509; Consumer Product Safety—
Guidelines for Suppliers, ISO, https://www.iso.org/standard/45967.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2021).
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Organization and its conventions, 237 and commercial aviation through the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 238 This has encouraged
scholars to propose different models for similar international standardization
for mitigating space debris. Larsen, for instance, relied on the decision-making process at the ICAO as a model for uniform and mandatory international
standards and procedures for space debris. 239 But the challenges arising from
the interactions generated in these fields are not comparable to those stemming from space activities, nor are the situations in which the interactions
occur.
Take the ICAO, for example. International commercial aviation, by definition, crosses international boundaries into and over sovereign territories
of various States, affecting not only the lives of passengers from multiple
nationalities but also lives and property on the ground. Uniform international safety standards for commercial aviation thus stem from conflicting
sovereignties rather than the need to effectively mitigate the externality. Imagine a world in which each State sets its own safety standards for aircraft.
Each aircraft manufacturer and operator would then be required to adjust
their operations to the specific standards mandated by each State where the
aircraft would land or even fly over, or otherwise be forced to avoid such
States. The immense costs associated with such a situation render the possibility of international commercial aviation dependent on international standardization.
Michael Milde explained that “[c]ivil aviation could not have evolved
without worldwide uniformity in regulations, standards and procedures.” 240
The Chicago Convention thus prescribes for the establishment of international standards, justifying deviations solely when “impracticable” and mandating notification thereof. 241 The rationale is that “in the absence of such
notification the foreign aircraft operators would rely on the standardized
procedures, facilities or services and the flight safety could be seriously jeopardized.” 242 As Paul Dempsey explained, “a State that fails to comply may
237. List of IMO Conventions, IMO, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/ListOfConventions.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2021); Posner & Sykes, Law of the
Sea, supra note 227, at 577.
238. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW ch. IV (2017).
239. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 503–5, 517–18.
240. Michael Milde, Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards: Problems of Safety Oversight, 45
GERMAN JOURNAL OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 3, 4 (1996).
241. Convention on International Civil Aviation arts. 37, 38, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
242. Milde, supra note 240, at 5–6.
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find its airman, aircraft air carrier, and/or airport certification and licenses
not recognized as valid by a foreign government, thereby terminating their
operations to, from, or through foreign territories, isolating it from the global
economy.” 243
Uniform international aviation safety standards and their subjection to
the decision-making process of the ICAO limit both the sovereign discretion
of States and the decision-making of private participants. Participants were,
and still are, ready to accept such international jurisdiction and mandates,
confining, at least de jure, their discretion to an “impracticability” criterion,
given the unique characteristics of international commercial aviation.
Conflicting sovereignties underly other fields which commanded uniform international standards. Maritime shipping traverses the economic
zones, territorial seas, and internal waters and enters ports of many different
participants, with safety standards established under the International Maritime Organization conventions and enforced by port authorities. 244 The
globalization of markets also means that products produced in one jurisdiction could be exported and used or sold inside the sovereign territory of
other countries. Potential transboundary effects and the subjection of an activity to multiple and changing jurisdictions justify the adoption of universal
standards, even if not legally binding. The more severe the potential effects
on health, safety, and the environment of each potentially affected sovereign,
the more likely sovereigns are to subject their decision-making to uniform
international standards and enforcement mechanisms.
As alluded to above, the interactions and situations which led the international community to install uniform international standards in other contexts do not pertain to outer space. In contrast to commercial aviation, space
activity can be conducted without ever engaging the jurisdiction of another
sovereign or affecting the nationals of another State. While it is true that
accidents may cause transboundary effects or the engagement of jurisdiction,
it is not a prerequisite for successful space activities. Uniform standards
would require States to relinquish part of their sovereign discretion without
a correlating challenge from multiple sovereignties and to expend unnecessary political and economic resources to reach a consensus on substance and
enforcement. Uniform international standards for debris mitigation constitute a superfluous and thus improbable outcome of the lawmaking process.
243. Id. at 104.
244. On port State control, see, e.g., J. Ashley Roach, The Polar Code and Its Adequacy, in
GOVERNANCE OF ARCTIC SHIPPING 144, 167–68 (Robert C. Beckman et al., eds. 2017).
1121

International Law Studies

2021

Current global governance for space debris mitigation should focus on generating incentives for participants rather than dictating standards or procedures.
2. Economic Instruments to Affect Policy Choices
Successful mitigation of space debris turns upon incentivizing participants
to implement effective policies. To that effect, scholars have proposed a variety of economic instruments, including increased liability, 245 fees, 246
funds, 247 Pigouvian taxes, 248 cap and trade systems, 249 trade mechanisms, 250
and more. The biggest drawback of such proposals, as some commentators
recognize, lies in their infeasibility for adoption as international law. 251 As
this section will explain, such proposals are inconsistent with the international lawmaking process through which international rules develop and exhibit a limited potential enforcement capability vis-à-vis outliers.
i. Monetary Obligations
Domestic legal systems employ economic instruments, inter alia, to affect individual or corporate behavior. 252 Direct carbon taxes, or indirect cap-andtrade systems, were proposed and implemented domestically to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. 253 Taxes on products such as gasoline or cigarettes
discourage harmful activities that would otherwise impose additional costs

245. Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 37; Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 255.
246. Plantz, supra note 10, at 610, 613, 617; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 514.
247. Plantz, supra note 10, at 610; Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 255; Larsen, Solving
the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 485–86; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 449.
248. Adilov et al., supra note 20.
249. Gopalakrishman & Prases, supra note 233, at 391–92; Ferreira-Snyman, supra note
6, at 49.
250. Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 36.
251. See, e.g., Plantz, supra note 10, at 611; Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 92; Salter, supra
note 1, at 228.
252. See, e.g., Shanjun Li, Joshua Linn & Erich Muehlegger, Gasoline Taxes and Consumer
Behavior, 6 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 302 (2014).
253. See, e.g., EU Emission Trading System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en (last visited Aug. 5, 2021); Gary M. Lucas Jr., Behavioral Public
Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017 UTAH LAW REVIEW 115.
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on society, 254 while import taxes or tariffs can be used to protect certain domestic industries. 255 The rationale is that society not only imposes costs to
force participants to minimize externalities but can use the resources collected for other national interests. 256 For example, one proposal is that carbon taxes could be collected and invested domestically to develop renewable
energy. 257 Although States may employ domestic taxes or fees to effectuate
debris mitigation policies, 258 proposals for imposing such measures internationally are misguided.
For space debris, taxation or fees would apply only to developed spacecapable States that conduct space activities, forcing them to expend resources to be distributed for the benefit of other States or to limit an externality with which these States have a greater ability to cope. While taxation
can successfully promote change domestically, 259 space-capable States are
unlikely to impose international taxes upon themselves contrary to their own
interests. For example, in the case of climate change efforts, although developed countries agreed to provide funding to developing counties for mitigation and adaptation efforts, 260 doing so is a far cry from accepting a global
tax on emissions. Similarly, the attempt to establish a cap-and-trade system
254. See Tobacco Taxation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://mca.essensys.ro/teams/health-promotion/tobacco-control/economics/taxation (last visited Aug. 5,
2021); James M. Sallee, The Taxation of Fuel Economy, 25 TAX POLICY & ECONOMICS 1 (2011).
255. See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 1 1030, U.S. TARIFF POLICY:
OVERVIEW (Jan. 11, 2021).
256. See, e.g., Donald B. Marron & Adele C. Morris, How Should Governments Use Revenue
from Corrective Taxes?, BROOKINGS (Jan. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/How-Should-Governments-Use-Revenue-from-Corrective-TaxesMarron-Morris-1.pdf.
257. See, e.g., Mark Muro & Jonathan Rothwell, Institute a Modest Carbon Tax to Reduce
Carbon Emissions, Finance Clean Energy Technology Development, Cut Taxes, and Reduce the Deficit,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/13carbon-tax.pdf.
258. As a point of reference, Elliot and Esty propose to impose fees or taxes on excess
pollution to facilitate the achievement of a zero-emission goal: “Charging polluters user fees
makes sense not only as a matter of compensatory justice, but also to create incentives to
develop better production processes as well as better pollution control in the future.” Elliot
& Esty, supra note 123, at 16.
259. For example, the Montreal Protocol led to the adoption of domestic tax instruments to encourage the reduction of ozone depleting substances. See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 197–202 (1998).
260. Climate Finance in the Negotiations, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/the-big-picture/climate-finance-in-the-negotiations (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
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in the Kyoto Protocol 261 failed to achieve broad compliance and the desired
goals. 262
Fees have also been suggested by some as a method for affecting behavior. For instance, some propose to distinguish between orbits and to impose
fees on the most widely used. 263 However, such proposals are unconvincing.
Unlike taxes, fees have been implemented successfully under international
law, but they were not intended to shape participants’ behavior. For example,
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), fees
are predicated upon the proposition that, except as provided for in the Convention, the resources beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines of
coastal States are the common heritage of mankind, and thus “owned” by
the international community. 264 The resources of the international Area were
largely inaccessible when UNCLOS was signed. 265 Also, most ocean resources outside the Area were subject to exclusive State jurisdiction. 266 The
rationale of funding international organizations through fees may, in fact,
extend to space, but such a proposition requires the existence of an interest
for cooperative action through such institutions. More importantly, neither
membership fees nor UNCLOS royalty payments were installed to affect
policy choices.
Similarly, because international law is founded on State consent, the
proposition of using funds to compensate investors for damage from space
debris when the liable party cannot be determined is also inappropriate for
international law. National funds to compensate people involved in motor
vehicle accidents are predicated on different incentives than those underlying
space debris. Such funds are based on the proposition that almost all of society engages in a dangerous activity that exposes it equally to its potential
externality, and therefore the public should collectively pay for injured parties when specific liability is unidentifiable. While a comparison in this case
is appealing, one must not forget that space activity is far less prevalent than
261. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162.
262. Daniel Bodansky & Lavanya Rajamani, The Evolution and Governance Architecture of
the United Nations Climate Change Regime¸ in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Detlef Sprinz & Urs Luterbacher eds., 2d ed.) (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 33–34), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2168859.
263. See Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247.
264. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 82, Dec. 12, 1982, 1833
U.N.TS. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
265. ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 89, at 87.
266. Hasin, supra note 5, § IV(C)(1).
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the use of motor vehicles and, at least currently, the victims are not individuals suffering bodily harm. Nor will accidents produce severe environmental
harm or detrimental effects on human rights, which have previously justified
attempts to establish international funds to compensate for damage caused
by oil spills or nuclear activities (these funds also suffer from severe implementation problems). 267
Critically, because imposing duties on States under international law requires their consent, financial instruments intended to affect policy choices
become improbable. In principle, governments impose behavior-modifying
taxes against the perceived self-interest of most, if not all, perpetrators of the
activity. For such a purpose, domestic systems have a recognized legislator,
either elected or imposed, that sets rules governing the actions of individuals
and exercises a monopoly over domestic power. But international law lacks
such a recognized authority, with only the Security Council possessing a similar, but rather confined, power. Under international law, the participants
whose actions constitute the target of any proposed behavior-modifying tax
or fee must consent to imposing such an instrument upon themselves. Outliers would severely undermine the effectiveness and manageability of such
rules—an investor could simply switch its operation to a non-member State
to free-ride the system. Therefore, behavior modifying financial instruments
must gain the consent of all potential participants, requiring them to impose,
on themselves, behavior modifying financial instruments in contrast to their
own perceived interest. That is as if smokers in the domestic system could
exclude themselves from the cigarette tax. The absurdity of such a proposition illustrates why the international legal system, with its current structure,
is unreceptive to behavior-modifying financial instruments.
Monetary obligations are thus neither appropriate nor likely to be
adopted on the international level. As any contributions would be predominantly laid on the developed space-capable States, which also possess the
greatest ability to adapt, their benefit from such a system is reduced. Yet, a
participant from a space-incapable State may be willing to increase debris
generation and risk since its share of the compensation for the effects of the
externality would be low. The international lawmaking process, based as it is
upon State consent, is simply inappropriate for imposing such instruments
to affect policy choices.
267. See generally Chie Kojima, Compensation Fund, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (last updated July 2019), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1837?rskey=Lt1jJV&result=1&prd=MP
IL.
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ii. Liability
Several authors have proposed to increase State liability for accidents caused
by debris in the hope that in doing so participants are deterred from generating debris and encouraged to remove it. 268 The evolution of international
investment law elucidates the limited effectiveness of liability without a dispute settlement mechanism and the improbability of such an instrument being adopted for space debris given current interactions and situations.
Before the establishment of the international investor-State dispute settlement system, when the host-State injured a foreign investor, the investor’s
home-State could have chosen to initiate a dispute with the host-State through
diplomatic protection. 269 Diplomatic protection, however, was subject to a
political process, in which the investor’s claims and rights are subject to the
discretion of the home-State. 270 The next evolution of protection through
access to domestic courts was also deemed insufficient given the perceived
inherent bias of such institutions. The international investor-State dispute
settlement system was established to promote international investments and
overcome these challenges. 271 The separation between an investment claim
and the political process is essential for the effective protection of investors
against damage from foreign States. 272 Accordingly, many investment tribunals have deemed procedural rights to be essential for protecting the substantive rights of investors. 273

268. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 272; Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 37;
Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 255; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at
491.
269. On diplomatic protection, see International Law Commission, Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection, 61 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 1 at 16, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006),
https://undocs.org/A/61/10, reprinted in [2006] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 pt. 2.
270. FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 138, at 3–4.
271. Id. at 8–9.
272. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, Oct. 30, 2016,
O.J. (L 11) 23, departs from this underlining rationale by establishing of an inter-State court.
273. See Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 102 (Aug. 3, 2004), 12 ICSID Rep. 171 (2007); RosInvestCo UK v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 130 (SCC Arb. Trib.
2007); Renta 4 et al. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary
Objections, ¶ 100 (SCC Arb. Trib. 2009); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HISTORY POLICY AND INTERPRETATION 345 (2010).
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The evolution of international investment law indicates that liability for
damage from space debris, without accompanying procedural rights, is insufficient on its own to sway the policy choices of participants against causing damage to individuals. To claim damages against another State, an investor would be required to submit its claim in that State’s domestic courts 274 or
to convince its own State to initiate the claim, infusing inter-State considerations into the equation. 275 But even if the investor convinced the relevant
State, or if the damage caused to a State justified an inter-State dispute, the
claimant State would be required to establish jurisdiction for any legally binding award. For the substantive rule to effectively encourage debris mitigation,
it must be accompanied by procedural rights.
It is unlikely, however, that a system like the international investor-State
dispute settlement system would be established for disputes between individuals and responsible States for damage from debris. The investment protection scheme strikes a balance between the participants: host-States benefit
from foreign investments, but these investments also pose a risk to investors.
The international investor-State dispute settlement system is intended to reduce such associated risks for investors by establishing a legally binding dispute settlement mechanism. The States that agree to the mechanism (in anticipation of hosting other State’s investors) assume the risk and gain the
benefit. This simply does not, at this point in time, pertain to outer space.
Consider the following example: State A and State B are both spacecapable States interested in promoting private space activities by their respective entities—Entity A and Entity B. Each State benefits from the activity of its entity. State B has no incentive to reduce the costs of Entity A by
providing it with a potential dispute settlement mechanism if it were to sustain damage from the activities of Entity B. Furthermore, in contrast to the
bilateral risk-benefit character of investment systems, space activities are vulnerable to adverse effects by the actions of third parties. So, a suggestion that
States A and B may wish to provide a dispute settlement mechanism to reduce the costs of their respective entities disregards the fact that the potential
risks and costs for Entity A and Entity B revert to their pre-dispute settlement levels, with the introduction of the risks from activities by an outlier
State C.

274. See Larsen, Does New Space Require New Liability Laws?, supra note 163, at 209.
275. See id. at 204.
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For such a mechanism to effectively sway policy choices, it must be universal or almost universal. As explained above, at this point, participants,
especially emerging ones, may have contradictory incentives, prioritizing
short-term gains in wealth and innovation. The international system is not
structured to provide international legislative mandates but rather requires a
careful balancing of conflicting interests and leverages.
V.

THE GLOBAL ORDER FOR SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION THROUGH
THE REGIME EVOLUTION APPROACH

The international regime governing space traffic management, including the
mitigation of space debris, will develop through the international lawmaking
process, in which the rules evolve pursuant to interactions between participants based on their goals, interests, and leverages. Although it is impossible
to anticipate its precise development, this section will outline its anticipated
evolution, proposing the adoption of a dynamic regime as its next stage.
To recall, the international rules for space debris mitigation would develop from “responses of key actors to . . . critical event[s],” 276 to shape
norms, practice, and law. 277 But it is also important to emphasize that “[a]
public order of human dignity is defined as one which approximates the optimum access by all human beings to all things they cherish.” 278 Given that
the proliferation of space debris risks upsetting society’s access to outer
space and the benefits such access provides, the international community
must aspire to install rules that would promote the highest aggregated gain
in values for all participants. The high probability of outliers indicates that
any instrument for space debris mitigation must command universality. As
the prospects of assembling a parliamentary diplomatic arena to negotiate an
authoritative instrument by majority vote 279 are slim, such instrument must
be adopted by consensus, thus balancing the conflicting or correlating interests of all relevant participants.
Before turning to the stages of evolution, it is important to delineate the
underlining characteristics of the externality in relation to the international
lawmaking process. As the review above indicates, space debris mitigation is
276. Reisman, Incidents, supra note 64, at 2.
277. See generally id.
278. Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 135, at 576.
279. This requires the existence of many participants exerting different leverages. See
generally 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 29–86.
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a problem of “cooperation” rather than “coordination.” 280 Its resolution is
in fact “mired by the fact that despite common goals, it is strategically advantageous for every actor to ‘cheat.’ ” 281 As Professor Eyal Benvenisti explained, “The extant literature on global cooperation emphasizes the following as being influential: the number of participants (whether a bilateral or
multi-party game); their expectation that they will repeat their engagement
indefinitely; and the quality of the information they have about the performance of their partners.” 282 He then emphasized that “additional antecedent
factors that help predict successful cooperation [include]: (1) scope (whether
single-issue or multiple issues); (2) frequency of iterations; and (3) relative
vulnerability of the parties.” 283
From a policy perspective, mitigating the adverse effects of space debris
constitutes a “super wicked” problem. 284 Richard Lazarus explains that such
problems defy “resolution because of enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated by any effort to
develop a solution.” 285 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber formulated the special characteristics of “wicked” problems. 286 These include, inter alia, the absence of a stopping rule to define an “end”; the existence of multiple possible
solutions; lack of “true and false” solutions; no ability to determine whether
a proposed solution is good; no opportunity for trial and error, with each
action leaving “ ‘traces’ that cannot be undone”; and the underlying problem
is a symptom of another problem. 287 Building on their analysis, Kelly Levin
and her co-authors added four unique features for what they define as “super
wicked problems”: (1) the time for taking action is running out, “exacerbating the ‘one shot’ problem”; (2) the absence of a central authority undermines the prospect of cooperation; (3) “[t]hose seeking to end the problem
280. See Eyal Benevenisti, The WHO—Destined to Fail?: Political Cooperation and the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 114 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 588, 589–90
(2020).
281. Id. at 590.
282. Id. at 590–91.
283. Id.
284. Kelly Levin et al., Playing it Forward; Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change (2010) (unpublished manscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.5287&rep=rep1&
type=pdf.
285. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1153, 1159 (2009).
286. Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4
POLICY SCIENCES 155 (1973).
287. Id. at 160–67.
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are also causing it”; and (4) “hyperbolic discounting,” in which decisionmakers discount “evidence of significant impacts, [and] tend to make decisions
that disregard this information and reflect, instead, very short time horizons.” 288
Space debris exhibits similar challenges for the international lawmaking
process. While scientific consensus may exist, the potentially catastrophic
effects and timetables are unclear. 289 Moreover, potential adaptation mechanisms in combination with the natural atmospheric sink magnify the ambiguity of specific risks to participants, increasing the relative costs of any cooperation. Any regime for the mitigation of space debris must be dynamic
and of continuing duration because there is no defined “end” for mitigating
an externality that increases with space activities. There are multiple possible
avenues but no ability to determine, ex ante, the most successful path. Critically, given that success needs to be evaluated in the long term, any decision
will leave significant factual and regulatory traces, and the possible adverse
effects of failure could be catastrophic.
Reducing space debris entails costs. 290 A recent COPUOS report illustrates that for space-capable States, regulations must not hinder the development of private industry, while for emerging participants, regulation must
not hamper their ability to develop space capabilities or industry. 291 The report includes calls by States for equity, including the “view that there was a
need for differentiated degrees of responsibility in the clearing of space debris, in
line with the space activities of each Member State.” 292
Reviewing the evolution of the regime for the mitigation of greenhouse
gas emissions reveals a stark similarity between the two externalities in relation to the international lawmaking process. The undisputed responsibility
of space-capable States for existing debris underlies suggestions for imposing
on them increased mitigation obligations and costs. 293 In climate change efforts, the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities similarly responds to the realization that, historically, most emissions were generated by
288. Levin et al., supra note 284, at 5–7.
289. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
290. Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 29; Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 85, 95; Viikari,
supra note 101, at 175; Roger Walker & C.E. Martin, Cost-Effective and Robust Mitigation of Space
Debris in Low Earth Orbit, 34 ADVANCES IN SPACE RESEARCH 1233 (2004).
291. COPUOS Report, supra note 157, ¶¶ 121, 124, 231.
292. Id. ¶¶ 122, 123 (emphasis added).
293. Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 257; Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 48; Plantz,
supra note 10, at 617; Viikari, supra note 101, at 183.
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developed countries, while developing countries must generate such emissions as a byproduct of industrialization critical for increasing their own quality of life.
In addition, similarly to space debris, although some scientific consensus
exists regarding greenhouse gas emissions, “there is a great deal of uncertainty about the details,” including the severity of the result and ability to
adapt. 294 For some developing countries, urgent developmental concerns
outweigh future risks from climate change. 295 More importantly, climate
change presents a greater danger to developing countries, primarily in the
Southern Hemisphere and small island States, than it does to developed
northern States, which may even benefit from change. 296 Critically, developed countries possess greater capabilities to adapt to the adverse effects of
climate change, arguably reducing their incentive to subject their decisionmaking process to regulations that impose strict emission reductions. 297
With increased private and public space activities, the international community must confront yet another super wicked problem. The interactions
that developed the regime governing climate change have much to teach
scholars and policymakers about the feasibility of any regime to mitigate
space debris. As analyzed below, this regime is anticipated to develop in three
distinct stages: (1) coordination, (2) cooperation, and (3) regulation.

294. ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (2013) [hereinafter POSNER & SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATION]; Scientific
Uncertainty, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0627-1; What are the Uncertainties and Their Implications?, AUSTRALIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, https://www.science.org.au/learning/general-audience/science-climate-

change/8-what-are-uncertainties-and (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
295. POSNER & SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATION, supra note 294, at 231.
296. Id. at 231–32; Meetings Coverage, Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change
Disproportionately Burdening Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses, as Second Committee Concludes General Debate, U.N. Meetings Coverage GA/EF/3516 (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm; Abrahm Lustgarten, How Russia
Wins the Climate Crisis¸ NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/16/magazine/russia-climate-migration-crisis.html.
297. See, e.g., Barry Smith & Olga Pilifosova, Adaptation to Climate Change in the Context of
Sustainable Development and Equity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY 877, 879–80 (James J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001), https://www.ipcc.ch/
site/assets/uploads/2018/03/WGII_TAR_full_report-2.pdf.
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A. Stage of Coordination
In the initial stage of a regime’s evolution, the international community engages in scientific discourse defining the problem, intergovernmental discussions begin, and perhaps non-legally binding rules agreed upon. In the case
of ocean resources, this was the age of mare liberum and its initial transformation during the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. For climate
change, this was the stage before the adoption of the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Daniel Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani identified six stages of development of the current international rules governing climate change efforts. 298
The first three of these stages, labeled “foundational phase,” “agenda-setting
phase,” and “pre-negotiation phase,” constitute initial stages of discourse in
which the problem is defined, publicized, and elevated to the intergovernmental realm for coordination between governments. 299 Global governance
for space debris mitigation is currently at this early stage of development.
The problem was defined, publicized, and elevated to the intergovernmental level where the discourse of the problem has produced non-legally
binding international guidelines by space-capable States and the United Nations system, later internalized by States through domestic law. The intergovernmental process continues but on a limited scale. The negotiations of
the Artemis Accords, for instance, produced a political commitment rather
than legally binding rules and are, in any event, concluded only on a multilateral basis between certain space-capable States. This indicates that the
United States and its allies do not currently consider a parliamentary diplomatic arena necessary or desirable. But the conclusion of the Accords indicates that after internalization of the guidelines by States, they were again
internationalized, continuing the international lawmaking process.
The interactions observed in the preliminary stage promote awareness
and produce “best practices,” in which States exchange knowledge and
methods to reduce debris. During this stage, each State unilaterally determines the mitigation obligations it imposes on its activities or on those it
authorizes. While susceptible to outliers, the limited number of active participants and low risk allowed such rules to effectively sway policy choices
while providing States with the flexibility to increase debris in furtherance of
national interests (e.g., weapons testing or leeway for investors). This type of
298. Bodansky & Rajamani, supra note 262, at 3–20.
299. Id. at 4.
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governance allows the space-capable States to optimize their gain in wealth,
innovation, and security while assuming limited safety risks in the short term.
The currently limited ability of space-incapable States to lodge interfering
claims reduces incentives for participants to establish a regime that promotes
equity and addresses environmental concerns. As explained above, emerging
participants, such as investors and space-incapable States, may prioritize
short-term gains in wealth, but given that the activity generates a debilitating
externality, others may exert pressure to reduce it. Public pressure may originate from accidents or simply through growing awareness, 300 thus affecting
the decisions of these participants. For space-incapable States, such governance facilitates the attraction of investors, but their reduced adaptation capabilities may generate an incentive to accept firmer rules, albeit with certain
concessions to alleviate their equity claims.
Thanks to the limited number of active participants, space-capable States
have been able to balance their adaptation capabilities with acceptable debris
levels. But greater participation of public and private entities diminishes the
regime’s effectiveness. Despite the augmented adaptation abilities of spacecapable States, the increased possibility for outlier behavior, which could
threaten gains in wealth, safety, health, and security for these States, propels
the need to strengthen manageability. This process will inevitably lead to the
regime’s evolution from coordination and national regulation to international cooperation. The following section will therefore propose a cooperation regime for space debris mitigation.
B. Stage of Cooperation
Greater participation generates greater incentives for cooperation to alleviate
the externality caused by the proliferation of space debris. As Eric Posner
and Alan Sykes explained, “[w]hen the behavior of governments deviates
from global cost-effectiveness, an opportunity for beneficial cooperation
arises that can improve the welfare of all nations as long as cooperation is not too
costly.” 301 Significant policy costs affect the regime’s evolution: space debris
results from essential activities that have various effects on multiple values
for participants and is produced through increasingly frequent interactions
between participants with varying levels of vulnerability. Because even minor
and random participation could generate debris, successful mitigation must
300. Although the public indirectly consumes space activities, it may not appreciate the
risks of an externality removed from daily life until its effects materialize.
301. Posner & Sykes, Law of the Sea, supra note 227, at 571 (emphasis added).
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be inclusive and designed to incorporate the most participants possible,
whether active or potential. Inclusivity requires compromises between the
interests and goals of varied participants, sounding in levels of discretion,
jurisdiction, and compliance mechanisms.
As discussed above, a rigid and static regime would be inappropriate
given the dynamic, developing, and inconsistent nature of space activities. A
regime must include dynamic elements in its governance structure to optimize values and allow decision-makers to quickly adapt their mitigation and
compliance strategies. Because of the participants’ varying stages of development and different economic interests, broad consensus requires that any
obligations be discretionary and include a bottom-up engagement of the private sector. Although the exact content of the rules will develop through the
lawmaking process, to optimize the aggregated gain in values, a feasible regime must include the following elements: (1) principles; (2) dynamic target
setting; (3) verification through transparency; (4) bottom-up engagement; (5)
dispute settlement; (6) assistance in space traffic management; (7) technological and financial assistance; and (8) preventing the regulatory race to the
bottom. Claims relating to these elements will be discussed below.
1. Principles
As explained above, successful global governance for space debris mitigation
must be dynamic and of continuing duration in order to accommodate
changing technological capabilities and factual circumstances. It must stipulate a set of principles, using generic terms, that would govern the relations
between the parties in the long term while allowing for their evolutionary
interpretation. Such principles may be articulated in a framework convention
(similar to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) or a constituent instrument of an organization. The following discussion will outline the
most important principles that will guide the other elements of the regime.
Participants must agree upon a definition of what constitutes space debris and the nature of the relationship between this definition and the concept of a “space object” for purposes of liability, responsibility, and jurisdiction. As explained above, the definition must exclude unidentifiable debris,
certain dispensable component parts, and perhaps even inoperable equipment from the definition of space objects. 302 Although the reduced responsibility entailed in such a proposition could, arguendo, undermine the prospect
302. See Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247; Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28.
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of affecting policy choices through liability, 303 as explained above, liability
produces limited, even illusionary, effects on policy choices, especially with
respect to small and unidentifiable debris.
Besides clarifying definitions, principles must include a general commitment to undertake best efforts to reduce debris. The obligation may be inferred from the treaties and is incorporated in the Artemis Accords. It also
stems from the concept of sovereignty as responsibility 304 and the legal
maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 305 As Benvenisti explained, as trustees
of humanity, sovereign States must take into account the interests of all affected stakeholders in their decision-making process when producing international effects on their interests. 306 Taking into account does not mean affording primacy, but consideration. If all participants remain guided by such
a conviction while retaining a certain degree of discretion, the values of equity, environmental protection, and safety could be balanced with wealth,
innovation, and security, on a broader scale.
Any inclusive regime must be based, even if only partially, on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. But it should avoid prescribing a differentiation in strict mitigation obligations between States, e.g.,
space-capable and -incapable States, differentiated as Annex I and Annex II
parties in a potential treaty. Such differentiation failed to gain traction in climate change efforts. Since the space-incapable States’ ability to contribute to
the externality in space is significantly lesser than with greenhouse gas emissions, it is doubtful that space debris negotiations will produce such rules.
Rather, claims expected to gain broad support include differentiation in limited financial or technological contributions, assistance in adaptation through
traffic management, and national differentiation based on State discretion.
To achieve the universality essential for the regime’s success, the governance structure should impose obligations of conduct rather than of result,
be contingent on national discretion, and encourage participation and compliance. 307 At the same time, obligations must be predicated on principles of
scientific accuracy and efficiency. Scholars and policymakers must remember
303. Dennerley, supra note 51; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 491;
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 272.
304. On a modern conception of sovereignty, see generally Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns
as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (2013).
305. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
306. BENVENISTI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 80, at 117–36.
307. See, e.g., Bodansky & Rajamani, supra note 262, at 29.
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that promoting outer space activities and the benefits these provide constitutes the objective of any international regulation. The mitigation of debris
serves only as the instrument to achieving this objective. Any international
governance structure must ensure debris reduction to the point where any
additional resources spent for prevention or removal would exceed the costs
produced by the externality itself. While any mitigation targets must necessarily prevent the potential of a Kessler Syndrome materializing, the international community would be required to conduct reasonable risk assessments
and set appropriate targets for debris mitigation, subject to subsequent scientific reevaluation. Such targets could vary based on orbit, fragment size, or
type of debris but would need to be measurable to avoid incurring costs to
reduce debris beyond the point of economic efficiency.
The increase in private activities may diminish the effectiveness of governmental control over activities States have authorized and supervise. Specifically, increased private ventures reduce the effectiveness of the broad responsibility under Outer Space Treaty Article VI as international law. The
more private ventures become independent from State activities, the less
these ventures should be considered “national activities.” Globalization and
the possibility of launches without authorization 308 further undermine the
effectiveness of Article VI in extending State responsibility for national activities, comprised of all activities by its nationals. Therefore, the international community should consider conforming responsibility and liability issues regarding outer space activities to principles of due diligence and attribution under international law. 309
Responsibility for private activities in space should align with general attribution under international law. Negotiating an instrument for space debris
mitigation provides an opportunity for the international community, especially the space-capable States, to adopt an interpretation distinguishing responsibility based on jurisdiction and presumed degrees of control exercised
over relevant entities: 310 (1) jurisdiction over sovereign activities, which translates into overall international responsibility given the assumed high degree
308. See, e.g., Larsen, Minimum International Norms For Mitigating Space Traffic, supra note 4,
at 755.
309. On liability for space activities, see generally Larsen, Does New Space Require New
Liability Laws?, supra note 163.
310. This approach is similar to, though distinguishable from, the one discussed by
Frans von der Dunk. See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law, SPACE, CYBER, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW PROGRAM FACULTY PUBLICATIONS 69, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=spacelaw.
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of control; (2) supervisory jurisdiction over non-sovereign activities by the
relevant non-governmental organizations, resulting in a due-diligence type
of responsibility consistent with an assumed lower and fluctuating degree of
control; and (3) jurisdiction of member States over activities conducted by
international organizations, resulting in a shared overall responsibility with
the international organization, again assuming a high degree of State control.
The final, critical principle constitutes the bottom-up engagement of the
private sector as part of the international lawmaking process. As Professor
Daniel Esty and Dena Adler explained, in the twenty-first century, an international regime architecture based solely on the Westphalian State system is
“ill-equipped to deal with many of today’s global challenges.” 311 Such concerns apply neatly to space debris, not only due to the sheer distance from
any effective control by a terrestrial government but also because corporations may exacerbate the externality by employing “flags of convenience,”
operating from the high seas, and launching independently of any governmental oversight. 312 The development of private capabilities indicates that
corporations may become outliers on their own accord, 313 making the effectiveness of any mitigation efforts contingent upon cooperation with the private sector. 314 Private entities should therefore be integrated into the international regime.
2. Dynamic Target Setting
Broadly speaking, three methods exist for swaying policy choices towards
mitigating space debris: (1) reliance upon self-enforcement of non-legally
binding guidelines, (2) legally binding negotiated commitments for targeted
mitigation quantification, and (3) dynamic target setting based on national
discretion. As this section will explain, the third option is the most appropriate for achieving this public policy goal.
311. Daniel C. Esty & Dena P. Adler, Changing International Law for a Changing Climate,
112 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 279, 284 (2018).
312. See, e.g., Caleb Henry, FCC Fines Swarm $900,000 for Unauthorized Smallsat Launch,
SPACE NEWS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://spacenews.com/fcc-fines-swarm-900000-for-unauthorized-smallsat-launch/.
313. See id.; see also, e.g., Kameron Virk, Tardigrades: “Water Bears” Stuck on the Moon After
Crash, BBC (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-49265125.
314. As a point of reference, with respect to the success of the Montreal Protocol,
Benedick explained that “The history of efforts to protect the ozone layer clearly demonstrates the crucial role played by industry in developing and implementing international environmental policy.” BENEDICK, supra note 259, at 309.
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The current international governance regime follows the first approach,
but its effectiveness diminishes with increased participants and potential outliers. 315 The second approach includes installing mandatory mitigation standards, financial instruments such as taxes and fees, and specific debris mitigation targets for participants. Although the analogy is imprecise, the Kyoto
Protocol attempted a similar regulatory approach for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, failing precisely because of the same policy characteristics exhibited by space debris. The lessons learned from Kyoto indicate that
as long as such characteristics persist, the feasibility of participants adopting
the second approach is doubtful, as is its potential to effectively sway policy
choices towards increased mitigation. The interactions observed so far indicate that the implementation of dynamic nationally based targets, similar to
the method chosen in the Paris Agreement, will generate the broad participation essential for successful debris mitigation.
Targets for debris mitigation may be composed of caps on debris generation based on the tonnage of space activities, the number of launches, or
the rate of growth. 316 Regardless of the specific metric chosen, it must be
relative and measurable progressively. States must be able to demonstrate
that through mitigation efforts the relative debris they generate, both short
term from launches and long term from deorbiting debris, improves over
time. “Improvement” in this sense may be curve-shaped for States developing space capabilities. In the initial stages of capabilities development, a
State’s debris generation will necessarily increase, but parties would commit
to a dynamic reduction process rather than to strict obligations. Such a dynamic process protects the interests of space-incapable States to increase
their gain in values through space activities. It does not hamper their ability
to develop capabilities, as some claimed in COPUOS. 317 Differentiation
based on national interests, while committing to the progressive realization
of mitigation objectives, may be acceptable to most, or even all, members of
the international community.
In the same sense that the Paris Agreement expects States to increase
their ambition for mitigation in every successive nationally determined contribution, any instrument to mitigate debris must also encourage every State
conducting or authorizing space activities to progressively reduce the levels
of debris it generates. Assume, for instance, that State A is developing space
315. See supra Section III.A.
316. For rate of growth, see Viikari, supra note 101, at 177.
317. COPUOS Report, supra note 157, ¶ 231.
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capabilities. Given the need to develop technology and capabilities, the debris generation may be a high level of X at the beginning. In the first commitment, it may thus commit to X+5. In its following commitment, it should
aspire to X+2, then X-1, X-5, and so forth. For State B, an established spacecapable State, with an existing relative debris generation of Y, it may commit
to Y-1, Y-2, and so on.
Dynamic targets promote universality and cost-effectiveness because
they reduce the probability that a participant will conclude that the benefits
of withdrawal exceed those of compliance. While shaming could marginally
affect States’ choices, the ability to adjust commitments according to specific
security or wealth considerations could promote cooperation even under
more modest mitigation targets. As will be explained below, to encourage
emerging participants to reduce their relative debris generation, space-capable States should execute agreements to implement limited technology sharing and financial contributions to assist developing participants.
3. Verification Through Transparency
To be meaningful, dynamic targets must be accompanied by transparent
tools for the verification of progress. Dynamic targets, by nature, do not
command strict verification and compliance mechanisms. But a transparent
procedure for evaluating progress could allow administrative bodies to signal
the need to increase commitments or shame outliers and motivate action. 318
Any verification process must not compromise the significant security
interests associated with space activities. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that military activities and their resulting debris should be exempt from
scrutiny as an initial step. As discussed above, although significant debris
originated from weapons testing, participants are unlikely to self-impose limitations to testing until they have developed the desired capabilities and further testing becomes unnecessary. Furthermore, given the inherent secrecy
involved, States are unlikely to consent to full transparency regarding their
military space activities, even if limited to debris generation. As an indication
of this, the Artemis Accords limit transparency between space-capable allies
to “policies,” “plans,” and “scientific information.” 319 It would therefore be
easier to achieve consensus for debris mitigation by excluding purely military

318. See, e.g., Benvenisti, WHO, supra note 280.
319. Artemis Accords, supra note 29, § 4.
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activities from either target setting or verification—or both. Admittedly, participants could abuse this limitation, defining civilian activities as “militaryrelated,” but the dynamic nature of the targets themselves indicates a minimal adverse effect.
To properly evaluate progress, the verification mechanism must include
transparent periodical reporting. The purpose would be “to ensure clarity
and tracking of progress towards achieving the parties’ NDCs [nationally determined contributions] and adaptation actions, as well as to provide clarity
on support provided and received by parties.” 320 Space debris originates
from activities by some participants while potentially affecting all participants relative to their stage of national development and adaptation capabilities. A reporting mechanism for space debris mitigation should thus extend
only to States that launch, procure, or otherwise authorize space activities. 321
It would be counterproductive to extend the reporting responsibility to all
activities by nationals; reporting must follow the ability to regulate and exercise some control. As will be further elaborated below, issue linkage between
technological and financial assistance and reporting is necessary to ensure
proper incentivization of compliance.
Reporting on adaptation capabilities should be performed by all States
that may potentially authorize or launch space activities. Such reporting ensures that when launches occur, States avoid creating unnecessary risks to
others. Ensuring that all States develop minimal capabilities to avoid debris
through information sharing is essential and may require limited concessions
from space-capable States. The United States, for instance, already shares its
traffic management capabilities with some partners. 322 Assisting others to
avoid collisions would benefit the more substantial participants.
Verification must not only rely on data collection but incorporate an independent scientific assessment. The mandate of an independent review
must include identifying failures, employing shaming tools, and suggesting
improvements when appropriate. Confining the decision-making process of

320. Bodansky & Rajamani, supra note 262, at 39.
321. Another alternative is to obligate universal reporting, with space-incapable States
allowed to claim an exception and avoid reporting. However, this would infuse an unnecessary bureaucratic step.
322. SPD-3, supra note 3; Quentin Verspieren, The United States Department of Defense
Space Situational Awareness Sharing Program: Origins, Development and Drive Towards Transparency,
8 JOURNAL OF SPACE SAFETY ENGINEERING 86 (2020).
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a regulatory international organization risks undermining its ability to respond to evolving risks and to propose necessary measures. 323 It is therefore
important that verification institutions can make dynamic interpretations of
their constituent instrument and have the power to expose non-compliance. 324 Although shaming seems a poor substitute for enforcement, it has
consequences, as complying participants may implement political or economic tools to express their disapproval of non-compliance.
Note that verification of progress is unlikely to be accompanied by trade
mechanisms to enforce the obligation to mitigate debris. The Montreal Protocol 325 and the prospect of trade sanctions have been proposed as a model
for a space debris instrument. 326 But the circumstances that commanded
such measures for the mitigation of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) are
distinct from those concerning the mitigation of space debris. This proposition thus disregards the distinct characteristics of the externality in relation
to the lawmaking process. The Montreal Protocol 327 imposes obligations on
all members to phase out ODSs, even if under differentiated responsibilities,
in accordance with fixed timetables. It is enforced through trade sanctions
on non-members and non-compliant members. 328 The Protocol successively
reduces ODSs and advances the world towards restoring the ozone layer by
the mid-twenty-first century. But it was directed at a rather simple problem
with specific characteristics. ODSs are specific aerosols used in certain products, produced by limited companies with available alternatives. 329 Replacement of ODSs had limited economic implications and did not require significant investment, while the health risks were certain and extremely high. 330
Critically, production of ODSs was not a necessary byproduct of developing
an essential industry to promote other values. Therefore, replacing their use
had a limited scope of effect. It is also important to remember that it would
have been increasingly costly in both wealth, health, and innovation to try
323. See, e.g., Benvenisti, WHO, supra note 280, at 595.
324. On dynamic interpretation, see ARSANJANI, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION, supra
note 209.
325. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
326. Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 36; Weinzierl, supra note 79, at 187.
327. The treaty has since been amended to include additional ODSs. On the negotiating
history and success of the Montreal Protocol, see generally BENEDICK, supra note 259.
328. See Scott Barrett, The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 19 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECONOMICS 345, 346 (1997).
329. POSNER & SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATION, supra note 294, at 229–30.
330. Id.
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and adapt to the destruction of the ozone layer, to which all participants
would be exposed unless it was arrested. It is clear that such characteristics
do not apply to space debris, and it is unlikely that State interactions would
produce a similar solution.
Trade mechanisms, however, may be employed by interested parties. As
was suggested in respect of greenhouse gas emissions, “climate clubs,” 331 or
in this case “debris clubs,” may be formed as consortiums of interested
States to employ trade mechanisms between themselves to encourage further
mitigation by parties and non-parties. The IADC and the Artemis Accords
serve as examples for coordination and cooperation between major spacecapable States concerning space activities in general and debris specifically.
Currently, however, given the strained relationship between Russia, China,
and the United States, clubs may have little overall effect without the joint
participation of these States.
4. Bottom-Up Engagement
As explained above, given the nature of space activities, private participants
may become outliers on their own accord or encourage developing participants to lower debris mitigation standards. To ensure the commitment of
private entities to the mitigation of space debris, space investors should be
allowed to assume international commitments for debris mitigation. In recent years, global governance has shifted from intergovernmental organizations to include many private entities exercising semi-regulatory roles in international law, such as standard setting and verification of compliance. 332
As Esty and Adler noted, the Paris Agreement failed to implement the necessary step of incorporating private entities and subnational units in favor of
a strict Westphalian architecture. 333 They explained that “global issues occur
along a structural spectrum, with some needing multi-tiered solutions and
some being amenable to more traditional top-down solutions. Where on this
spectrum a particular issue falls depends on the specific nature of the concern and the distribution of authority and capacity to respond.” 334 In the
context of space debris, federal units, cities, and municipalities may not be
331. William Nordhaus, A New Solution: The Climate Club, NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS (2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/06/04/new-solution-climateclub/.
332. BENVENISTI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 80, ch. 2.
333. Esty & Adler, supra note 311, at 283.
334. Id. at 284.
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as relevant as they are to greenhouse gas emissions, but the cooperation of
space investors is essential for success.
As explained above, corporations will aspire to increase their gains in
wealth and innovation, while States should establish rules to promote health,
safety, security, equity, human dignity, and environmental protection. But
States have conflicting incentives, and space-incapable States may attract investors through lenient regulations, thus sacrificing such values for the benefit of their wealth and innovation. The fact that space activities may largely
be removed from terrestrial jurisdiction and control indicates that the cooperation of private entities is essential for mitigating both the regulatory race
to the bottom and the debris problem.
In producing debris, space corporations generate an externality that affects their field of operations. 335 Therefore some incentives to cooperate
with mitigation efforts exist. This contrasts with the climate crisis, where the
businesses generating the externality, such as fossil fuel companies, electricity
producers, and auto manufacturers, do not directly suffer the adverse effects.
Space debris provides the opportunity to engage the private “polluters” in
achieving international public policy objectives.
An international instrument for space debris mitigation should incorporate non-governmental organizations as observers 336 and allow private space
investors to assume international commitments for progressive debris mitigation. Investors could benefit from the publicity and respect involved, as
well as reduced debris, and space-capable States would offset the leverage
space-incapable States may exert in attracting investors with weaker commitments. Space debris mitigation thus provides the opportunity to introduce a
new international treaty architecture, modeled on Esty and Adler’s proposal.
5. Dispute Settlement
Dispute settlement constitutes an important part of any effective international regulation. In contrast to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions,
where violations are necessarily non-adversarial, 337 in the case of space debris, certain failures may exhibit adversarial qualities. As explained above,
however, as an instrument to affect space debris policy choices, liability is
relatively weak, given both lack of jurisdiction and evidentiary problems, and
335. Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 95.
336. On non-governmental organizations observer status, see ROSALYN HIGGIN ET
AL., OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED NATIONS ¶¶ 8.81–8.85 (2017).
337. Bodansky & Rajamani, supra note 262, at 42.
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investor-State dispute resolution mechanisms stem from characteristics lacking in space activities. But for cooperation purposes, dispute settlement may
be weaker and voluntary, with enforcement between States contingent more
on verification than arbitration.
International law usually provides for rather weak enforcement mechanisms relying mostly on reciprocity, power, and outcasting. 338 Many treaties
prescribe for dispute settlement through negotiations, non-legally binding
commissions, and, on rare occasions, international arbitration. But even
when States consent to extensive inter-State arbitration, such as under UNCLOS, exclusions apply, demonstrating that international dispute settlement
rarely includes issues at the core of national interests. 339 The prominent exception is found in international investment protection treaties, 340 but even
this regime is under stress. 341
States would probably reject a mandatory third-party decision-making
instrument for space debris that would affect their ability to protect their
national security and optimize domestic gain in values such as health, wealth,
and innovation. Rather, any dispute settlement will likely require negotiations
in good faith or prescribe an additional optional consent, as was the case of
the optional protocol to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone. 342 But, were the verification mechanism to allow an extended ability to shame a participant that may reduce the need for any dispute
resolution. It should also be noted that private participants may be exposed
to compulsory domestic litigation and may be susceptible to enforcement by
domestic courts.
6. Assistance in Space Traffic Management
International space traffic management must develop to avoid collisions between active spacecraft and space debris or immovable active objects during
338. See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE LAW JOURNAL 252 (2011).
339. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 264, art. 298.
340. Charles H. Brower II, Politics, Reason, and the Trajectory of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 49 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 271, 272–78 (2017).
341. Id.; W. Michael Reisman, Negotiating and Maintaining Investment Treaties: Mechanisms
for Anticipating and Controlling Textual Drift, 6 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 75, 75–6 (2019) [hereinafter Reisman, Textual Drift].
342. Optional Protocol of Signature to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 169.
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launch, orbit, or reentry. 343 Adaptation to the space debris problem means
developing and deploying monitoring and maneuvering capabilities to avoid
space debris and increasing protection capabilities for new satellites and
craft, especially from small and unidentifiable fragments. As alluded to
above, for an international regime for debris mitigation to be efficient, it
must balance mitigation and adaptation. Increasing adaptation may require
less investment in mitigation and vice-versa.
Excluding the dreaded, though uncertain, materialization of a Kessler
Syndrome, the space debris problem provides for much greater capacity for
adaptation than greenhouse gas emissions, thus mandating a different approach. In the case of greenhouse gas emissions, adaptation is analogous to
using a band-aid to cover a gunshot wound. Many participants can do little
to adapt to rising sea levels that threaten to sink cities and nations, destroy
coral reefs and biodiversity, and diminish primary food supplies. But for
space debris, participants may avoid a specific activity altogether or successfully adapt through technological innovation by increasing tracking, maneuverability, or protection.
Establishing international data sharing for identification and location of
debris 344 not only promotes mitigation but may be acceptable to space-capable States possessing such means. By increasing the ability of States and private entities to avoid debris, space-capable States will achieve gains in safety
and security while avoiding injury to other values.
7. Technological and Financial Assistance
Participants wishing to mitigate space debris must incur costs to develop and
implement relevant technological innovations. Thus, space-incapable States
will likely demand financial assistance and technology sharing from developed space-capable States as a precondition for accession to any international regime for space debris mitigation. The space-capable States will have
an incentive for some concession on this point, as increased debris adversely
affects their wealth, safety, and security. To prevent a regulatory race to the
bottom, emerging participants must be incentivized to implement stricter
debris mitigation schemes by, inter alia, providing them with the means and
technology to do so. To gain broad consensus, however, any such element

183.

343. On space traffic management, see von der Dunk, Traffic Management, supra note
344. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 446; G.A. Res. 74/82, supra note 3, ¶ 13.
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must be subject to compliance verification and be more voluntary than mandatory.
In the past, claims for equity of developing participants were accompanied by requests for technology sharing or financial assistance. When raised
as preconditions for accessing resources, such claims have had limited success. 345 As long as a level playing field has been preserved, technological edge
has not been a source of public outcry. 346 On the other hand, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement provide for technology sharing and financial contributions for developing countries for mitigation and adaptation efforts.
However, while certain elements, such as traffic management and information about the location of debris, may be shared internationally, other elements, such as maneuverability technology and protective equipment are
unlikely to be shared. As explained above, space debris mitigation depends
on technology, yet the more space-capable States invest in developing a private industry, the more the technology will be proprietary private technology. Adaptation technology, such as maneuvering systems, protective equipment, and guidance systems, may provide a competitive edge for corporations, thus making them extremely valuable. In addition, space technology
could be dual-use, meaning that it may have both military and civilian applications. 347 For some participants, providing others with space technology
may be akin to promulgating nuclear power as a replacement for fossil
fuels. 348 Nuclear weapon programs have been developed under the cover of
civilian nuclear power generation, and space programs may be used to develop ballistic missiles. 349

345. See, e.g., ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 89, at 18–19.
346. See Dani Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS POLICY (2018), https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/
files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf.
347. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 371, 467; von der Dunk, Traffic Management,
supra note 183, at 391.
348. See ROBERT J. GOLDSTON, CLIMATE CHANGE, NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION: MAGNITUDE MATTERS (2011) (prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy), https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1013075.
349. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. MCCALL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 1 0938, IRAN’S BALLISTIC
MISSILE AND SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAMS 2 (2020); Uzi Rubin, Iran’s Space Program, JISS
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://jiss.org.il/en/rubin-irans-space-program-2/; Michael R. Pompeo,
U.S. Secretary of State, Iran’s Space Program Is Dangerous, Not Peaceful (Apr. 25, 2020),
https://ge.usembassy.gov/irans-space-program-is-dangerous-not-peaceful-april-25/.
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In conclusion, some technology sharing will become necessary as debris
proliferation increases the costs of space operations for States and investors.
The more mitigation technology each participant employs, the less additional
investment in both mitigation and adaptation technology would be required
for others. At the same time, the significant security implications require
finetuning technology sharing to avoid the sharing of dual-use technology.
Thus, technology sharing will likely be limited to that which reduces debris
during launch or in orbit, rather than to deorbiting technology, which may
include propulsion and other capabilities. Investors will, however, be reluctant to share technology, and it is unclear whether overall reduced costs will
provide sufficient incentives.
8. Preventing the Regulatory Race to the Bottom
The effectiveness of any instrument adopted for space debris mitigation depends, inter alia, on reducing the potential of a regulatory race to the bottom
that weakens mitigation controls. To that end, any governance structure
must incorporate rules that: (1) reduce incentives for space-incapable States
to relax mitigation regulations, (2) facilitate all States in increasing their commitments for debris mitigation, and (3) discourage investors from shifting
their operations to a State with lenient mitigation regulations. This section
outlines a proposal to utilize the interrelation between international investment law and space debris mitigation to promote such public policy goals.
Esty explains that with respect to terrestrial investments, “there is little
empirical evidence of companies moving to ‘pollution havens.’ ” 350 He suggests that differences in environmental commitments may even be beneficial
from a trade perspective. 351 While many factors may affect a company’s
choice to move terrestrial operations, certain counter considerations exist.
First, such operations will necessarily be subject to some level of control and
risk of a political decision by the host-State, which may or may not be subject
to investment protection. Second, certain ventures require natural resources
and employees with expertise that may not exist in such “havens.” Finally,
infrastructure may be difficult to move, jeopardizing long-term reliance upon

350. Daniel C. Esty, Free Trade and Environmental Protection, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONS. Axelrod & Stacy D. VanDeveer eds., 5th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Esty, Free Trade].
351. Id.
MENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 389, 394 (Regina
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currently lenient regulations, while challenging amendments through investment protection is costly and far from certain to succeed. Space investments
are somewhat different in this regard.
Launch facilities will exhibit similar characteristics, but post-launch activities are only theoretically subject to the jurisdiction of the launching or
authorizing State. These States, especially if they are space-incapable, may
have only a limited ability to exercise control or pose any risk to investments.
Operators could register in one State while conducting their operations entirely in another State and threaten to amend such de jure jurisdiction if regulations change. With expropriation and domestic litigation proceedings
against investors in host-States becoming less likely, the potential for a race
to the bottom increases. To borrow from environmental rules, in certain circumstances,
competition across jurisdictions may precipitate a welfare-reducing cycle of
weakening environmental commitments as political leaders seek to relax
their environmental standards to attract investment and jobs. In practice,
governments rarely lower their legal standards to improve their competitive
position. They may, however, relax the enforcement of these standards or
fail to raise environmental requirements to optimal levels for fear of exposing their industries to higher costs than foreign competitors face. 352

Furthermore, pursuant to what has been called the “governance gap,”
space investors, like other foreign investors in the past, “may have sufficient
economic power to dissuade a state from regulating them, so their duties
under local law may be in name only.” 353 To encourage emerging participants
to impose increased standards on mitigation and progress towards more ambitious targets, any incentive to reduce regulatory enforcement must be
counteracted.
Allowing an externality to adversely affect a common area, as Esty insightfully commented, is an “unfair (and economically inefficient) basis on
which to establish a competitive advantage.” 354 Esty explained how trade
agreements might present opportunities to confront such challenges:
[The North American Free Trade Agreement’s] investment chapter also
broke new ground in addressing environmental issues. . . . The treaty also
352. Id. at 394.
353. Steven R. Ratner, Survey Article: Global Investment Rules as a Site for Moral Inquiry, 27
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 107, 120 (2019).
354. Esty, Free Trade, supra note 350, at 395.
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contains a “pollution haven” proviso that declares that parties will not seek
to attract investments by relaxing environmental standards or cutting back
on enforcement—language recently replicated by the EU and Canada in
their 2017 trade agreement [the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement]. 355

The North American Free Trade Agreement provision, however, provided only for consultation in case of the commitment’s violation, 356 and the
recent United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement removed even this
symbolic normative statement. 357 Crucially, neither the North American Free
Trade Agreement nor the similar Article 24.5 of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement358 provides for enforcement of a
normative obligation or even excludes projects attracted through relaxed environmental standards from investment protection. An instrument adopted
for space debris mitigation must, however, exclude certain investments in
space from investment protection. Doing so would discourage corporations
from shifting operations to potential “debris havens.”
This section proposes two interrelated modifications for the investment
protection system: (1) the exclusion of investments located in outer space
from investment protection, and (2) the exclusion of foreign investments
attracted through lenient debris mitigation standards from the definition of
a qualifying investment. These modifications will incrementally affect decisions through their application by investment tribunals, which will be required to take them into account for treaty application and interpretation
purposes and application per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 359

355. Id. at 399.
356. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1114, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 289 (1993).
357. Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and
Canada art. 14.16, Jan. 1, 2020, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/
FTA/USMCA/Text/34_Final_Provisions.pdf.
358. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 272, art. 24.5(1).
359. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 31.
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i. Exclusion of Investments Located in Outer Space
Investments located entirely or primarily in outer space should be excluded
from investment protection. This proposal stems from two interrelated characteristics of such investments: (1) the control exercised by the host-State is
limited, and (2) extending such protections is detrimental to the home-State.
In a 2018 issue of the Journal of World Investment and Trade, several authors
considered the application of the investment law regime to outer space activities. 360 The authors assumed that the extension of investment protection
to space activities was warranted or constituted a beneficial international policy. As the international investor-State dispute settlement system is already
under serious stress, considering whether such coverage was plausible under
definitions found in investment treaties, as the authors had, 361 is insufficient.
Scholarship must consider whether the international community would gain
from the extension of investment protection to space activities, that is,
whether it is good policy and whether expansion could result in another
backlash from private capital and technology exporting States as an indicator
of whether it would be a good systemic policy. Careful consideration leads
to the conclusion that it would not.
Some suggest that providing investors the necessary assurances by extending investment protection would promote the development of space capabilities and would thus be beneficial. 362 This is based on two interrelated
misconceptions: (1) the triangular relationship between the home-State,
host-State, and investor extends equally into outer space; and thus (2) space
investments are identical to terrestrial investments in the sense that protection offsets political risk for investors from the host-State. 363 When space
investments are located solely—or primarily—in outer space, the rationale
of investment protection under this triangular relationship ceases to exist.
360. Stephan W. Schill et al., Oceans and Space: New Frontier in Investment Protection?, 19
JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 765 (2018); Christopher Greenwood, Oceans
and Space: Some New Frontiers for International Investment Law, id. at 775; Mahulena Hofmann &
P.J. Blount, Emerging Commercial Uses of Space: Regulation Reducing Risks, id. at 1001; Baumann
& Bajjati, supra note 137; Malanczuk, supra note 137; Hobe et al., supra note 137.
361. See, e.g., Hobe et al., supra note 137, at 1035–44; Malanczuk, supra note 137, at 973–
86.
362. Hobe et al., supra note 137, at 1034.
363. See FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 138, at 8–10; SALACUSE, supra
note 131, ch. 2; Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of International Investment Agreements with
Implication for Treaty Interpretation and Design, 113 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 482, 497–500 (2019).
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Operating in outer space under a flag of convenience State would only
subject the investor to risks arising from the State’s modifications to the authorization and its supervision, 364 rather than subjecting its tangible property
to potential expropriation. To be sure, licenses and permits issued by hostStates would be considered eligible assets under most, if not all, asset-based
definitions of investment. Many early definitions of investment were extremely broad, extending to “every kind of asset” and “designed to protect
as wide a range of investment forms as possible,” 365 with some specifically
referring to “licenses” as examples for such assets. 366 But even the recent
United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement, which prescribes a much
narrower definition of an eligible investment, would extend coverage to licenses to conduct space activity as these will likely confer rights protected
under domestic law. 367 Scholars might quibble over whether it truly includes
risk, but risk as an element of the Salini test only applies to disputes under
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States 368 and treaties that include such conditions
under the definition of investment. 369

364. To borrow from the terminology used in the Outer Space Treaty.
365. SALACUSE, supra note 131, at 180.
366. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty art 1(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95; Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Armenia for the Liberalisation, Promotion and
Protection of Investment art. 1, Arm.-Japan, Feb. 4, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/
files/000343447.pdf; Treaty Between the United States of America and Jamaica Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment art. 1, Jam.-U.S., Feb. 4, 1994,
T.I.A.S. 97-307 [hereinafter U.S.-Jamaica BIT]; see also Malanczuk, supra note 137, at 984–
86.
367. United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement, supra note 357, art. 14.1 n.2
368. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
369. The Salini test refers to three criteria: contribution, duration, and risk. Some International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals have considered
these criteria to apply as conditions for an eligible investment under the ICSID Convention
through interpretation of the term “investment.” While investment is not defined under the
ICSID Convention, it is questionable whether such conditions may be interpreted to delineate an eligible investment under investment protection treaties that precisely define the
investment. See Anglia Auto Accessories Ltd. v. Czech Republic, SCC Case No. V2014/181,
Final Award, ¶ 150 (SCC Arb. Trib. 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8556.pdf; see also W. Michael Reisman & Anna Vinnik,
What Constitutes an Investment and Who Decides?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 50 (Arthur W. Rovie ed.,
2010).
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Under normal circumstances, an authorization or license for a foreign
investor to conduct space activities would be covered under many definitions
of “investment.” Although some treaties may include an “in the territory”
requirement either for a qualified investment, or the dispute settlement
mechanism, 370 tribunals have varied on how strictly such a “condition” was
interpreted or applied to limit the international investor-State dispute settlement system. 371 But while the property itself may be in space, and thus strictly
speaking, outside the “territory” of the State, a license to operate is not.
A tribunal faced with a claim by an investor concerning a license is therefore likely, in many instances, to conclude that a license granted by the State
is, in fact, a protected investment. 372 Scholars, however, fail to question
whether such a conclusion promotes the optimum global order or benefits
the international community. 373 Because a license entails supervision, it may
include elements relating to the safety of personnel, royalty payments to the
host-State, or rules concerning debris mitigation. Revocation or amendment
of a license may thus be subject to investment arbitration should it adversely
affect the investors’ gains in wealth. As a corollary, subjecting such a license
to investment protection may affect the policy choices of the host-State in
respect of the investor’s activities.
The exact scope of protection will depend on the circumstances, including the expectations of the specific investor and any agreement on regulatory
stability. Emerging State participants are, however, incentivized to provide
such assurances because they may otherwise be unable to participate in space
activities and the benefits they entail. As Jean-Michel Marcoux explained,
“[w]hen facing the proposition of a large investment on its territory several
countries are ready to offer incentives and adopt a legal framework that is
consistent with the interests of foreign investors.” 374

370. See, e.g., U.S.-Jamaica BIT, supra note 366, art. 1; Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of Ukraine for the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments art. 1, Isr.-Ukr., Nov. 24, 2010, https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/dynamiccollectorresultitem/ukraine_bit/he/international_agreements_ukraine_bit
-eng.pdf.
371. See Christina Knahr, Investments “In the Territory” of the Host State, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 42 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009); SALACUSE, supra note 131, at 188–92.
372. See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra note 137, at 984–85.
373. See, e.g., id. at 979–81; Hobe et al., supra note 137, at 1042–44.
374. JEAN-MICHEL MARCOUX, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GLOBALIZATION 64–65 (2019).
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Emerging State participants may offer corporations long-term benefits
in wealth while compromising safety and environmental protection. Extending investment protection to space activities risks perpetuating those policies
and exacerbating the regulatory race to the bottom. Although the extent of
the risk is unclear, and it is unknown whether a tribunal would be willing to
compensate an investor for a regulatory change correcting an internationally
harmful activity, there are few justifications for providing such protection in
the first place.
Understanding why the rationales of investment protection do not apply
to space requires returning to the triangular relationship mentioned above
and considering the interests and goals of the participants involved:
Home State

Host State

Investor

The relationship between the investor and the host-State is quite straightforward and revolves around gains and risks to wealth. For the host-State,
the investment generates domestic gains through the investor’s infusion of
capital and technology. Investors invest to increase their own wealth but assume many risks in engaging in foreign investment. These risks include, inter
alia, expropriation, regulations tantamount to expropriation, revocation of
benefits, failure to provide safety and protection, and arrest and imprisonment. Such risks concern the regulatory and police powers of the host-State,
which may adversely affect a foreign national or corporation due to a preference for domestic interests over those of foreigners. 375 In agreeing to avail
the investors of investment protection, host-States ameliorate, to a certain
degree, some of these risks. 376

375. See Sykes, supra note 363, at 499.
376. See id. at 491–503.
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Investors engaged in outer space activities, however, assume significantly
lower risks from decisions of host-States. Space investments are not physically located under the control of the host-State, which makes the prospect
of expropriation or failure to provide protection quite limited. The investor
may operate and control the property from another State, thus not being
personally subject to the host-State’s police powers. The only element subjected to home-State control is the “license,” but it is not difficult to imagine
that an alternative “license” might be issued by another State, and the investment transferred to the jurisdiction and control of a different participant.
Therefore, investors would assume a very low level of risk while immersing
themselves in the protections offered by investment treaties.
But a more stunning realization stems from the fact that home-States
have little, or perhaps even opposing, incentives when it comes to protecting
foreign space investments by their citizens. Home-States do not conclude
investment protection treaties solely for the benefit of their citizens but rather are driven by their own goals and incentives. 377As Marcoux put it, “Acting as the home states of foreign investors, capital exporting states perceive
foreign investment as a means to increase trade with host states, secure procurement in natural resources for their economy and ensure the repatriation
of parts of the profits earned by national investors.” 378 Space investments
flip these incentives.
Home-States of space investors will likely be the developed space-capable States, as is evident from current private ventures. 379 Because these investments can be controlled from anywhere, home-States gain little from
having such investments licensed under the domestic laws of another State.
As host-States can only attract space investors through regulations, these
may allow for increased debris or otherwise “relax the enforcement” of mitigation standards, 380 thus augmenting investors’ gains in wealth. But the proliferation of debris increases the costs for all participants in space, with the
largest users arguably incurring most costs and risks. Foreign investments in
space could be detrimental to the interests of space-capable States, not only
from the perspectives of lost revenue, jobs, or resources, but also due to
increased costs from debris and potential security and environmental risks.

377. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 LAW AND
BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 155, 158 (2007).
378. MARCOUX, supra note 374, at 63.
379. See Weinzierl, supra note 79, at 177–80.
380. See Esty, Free Trade, supra note 350, at 394.
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States have excluded certain types of investments from investment protection due to adverse effects on their national interests. As Michael Loughlin has shown, the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement has modified the North American Free Trade Agreement to exclude from investment
protection, and thus promotion, both through ratione materiae and ratione personae, investments deemed detrimental to U.S. economic interests. 381 Given
the risks posed to their national interests, space-capable States should strive
to exclude foreign investments in outer space from investment protection to
discourage investors from transitioning.
One caveat for such a policy concerns the prospect of investors negotiating such terms via contracts with potential host-States. Julian Arato recently suggested that contracts may replace investment protection by allowing investors and States to contract around treaty terms. 382 The problem with
Arato’s suggestion from an investment protection perspective is that he
views investments narrowly as single transactions. In contrast, investments
are dynamic long-term processes, with interactions occurring throughout the
life of an investment. Investment protections are placed through treaties precisely because the incentives of the host-State change after the initial costs
are incurred. 383 After an investment has been made, the host-State has significant leverage to negotiate around treaties for any subsequent investment.
However, for space-related activities, negotiating contracts between investors and States can alleviate some of the dire effects of relying on bilateral
investment treaties. Contracts are weaker than investment treaties as instruments for the promotion and protection of investments. Breach of an investment treaty, or withdrawal from it, has broader implications than the
breach of a single contract with an investor. 384 More importantly, shifting
investor-State disputes from the realm of investment protection to one resembling commercial arbitration through contracts may even entail benefits
for public order. It will allow countersuits and be subject to a “public policy”
exception for enforcement.
The exclusion of space-based investments from investment protection
may be achieved through provisions made part of any instrument concerning
space debris or by forcing the renegotiation of existing treaties. Whatever
381. Michael Loughlin, NAFTA Chapter 11 to USMCA Chapter 14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
382. Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 26 (2019).
383. Sykes, supra note 363, at 498.
384. Id. at 500.
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the specific mechanism space-capable States may successfully employ, it will
be consistent with the distinct situations of such investments, and it will increase the overall gain in values by arresting, even slightly, the regulatory race
to the bottom.
ii. Exclusion of Investments Attracted to “Debris Havens”
As explained above, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement pioneered a provision that
recognizes that the use of lenient environmental rules to attract investments
should be avoided. Both treaties, however, failed to provide for the enforcement of this normative obligation. Space debris mitigation provides an opportunity to avoid this mistake and exclude assets procured through the violation of normative environmental obligations from qualified investments.
In a similar vein, many investment treaties include a caveat that covered
investments must have been conducted lawfully under domestic law. Intended to confront corruption in investment practice, these provisions exclude investment protection for investments procured through bribes or in
violation of domestic law. While many investment cases include allegations
of misconduct, few have excluded protection based on those claims. Exclusion based on corruption is debatable, to say the least; it is a claim available
to one side to the detriment of the other, although both are in the wrong. 385
An investor is denied the right to benefit from conduct that is denounced
internationally, even if officials demanded it as a de facto prerequisite for
investment.
The same rationale applies to space debris. Engaging in space investments through flag of convenience States to the detriment of the other members of the international community is not only unfair, but it should similarly
exclude international protection. From an international perspective, by promoting such conduct, the host-State not only fails to consider the interests
of foreign stakeholders but acts contrary to the interests of the international
community, thus adversely affecting all participants.
Concluding that an investment was attracted through a “debris haven”
would require a tribunal to evaluate whether the regulations in place or their
enforcement were, in fact, unacceptably lenient. If the case concerns the
385. See Andrew T. Bulovsky, Promises Unfulfilled: How Investment Arbitration Tribunals
Mishandle Corruption Claims and Undermine International Development, 118 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 117 (2019).
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“weakening” of enforcement, an analysis by a tribunal can be straightforward, but to conclude that regulations were lenient to begin with will require
a comparison to other States. As the claim would be raised by the State visà-vis the investor, the State would be required to muster evidence in that
respect. The history of investment treaties shows that when arbitrators are
provided with generic terms and broad obligations, they tend to develop
those terms and obligations through interpretation and application. 386 While
the application of such a treaty may take on a life of its own, when an investor
actively engages in conduct to the detriment of the international community
for personal gain, international law should not protect and perpetuate the
wrongful conduct.
For the reasons given above, space-capable States possess an incentive
to promote such a rule when it comes to space debris, even if they lack such
incentives for other environmental concerns. Space debris is a prime candidate for pioneering an amendment to the international investment system
that may, in the future, spillover and increase gains in health and environmental protection in other areas as well.
C. Stage of Regulation
The regime proposed in the second stage would only remain effective as long
as participants cooperate, States retain significant control, and the number
of interactions remains moderate. Certain intervening factors may render
this regime ineffective, but as space activities increase, it will necessarily develop further. Such development may generate claims to install some of the
instruments proposed by scholarship today, but that would only become effective and feasible when situations and interactions change. The following
analysis of these possible developments could facilitate a quick and informed
response by policymakers.
A significant increase in private space activity may reach a point at which
State authorization and supervision will no longer constitute effective regulation. In addition, as evident from the Artemis Accords, 387 claims will be
made for evolving security zones around space installations, perhaps developing to resemble those around artificial islands and ocean installations. 388
Absent effective State control, and with participants subject to multiple jurisdictions, interactions will begin to resemble those observed in maritime
386. See generally Reisman, Textual Drift, supra note 341.
387. Artemis Accords, supra note 29, § 11.
388. UNCLOS, supra note 264, art. 60.
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shipping or commercial aviation. This may generate the incentives necessary
to establish legally binding rules for safety, which will likely include debris
prevention and avoidance. 389
With the development of technology necessary to remove space debris
from orbit, and especially should such debris removal activities become costeffective, the interpretation and application of jurisdiction and responsibility
will be forced to evolve accordingly. In respect of space resources, the
United States chose to present its claim to recognize property rights as an
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty rather than to attempt its amendment. This was a sensible path. The treaty includes provisions for the prohibition of sovereignty claims, certain military activities, and the placing of nuclear weapons in outer space. Any attempt to renegotiate the treaty may have
led to the renegotiation of these provisions, which is premature at this juncture. A similar path should be chosen in respect of space objects. Through
interpretation, participants will need to further qualify claims to retain jurisdiction over inoperable space objects, supported by the evolving context,
including the technological ability to remove them in a commercially viable
way.
A critical intervening element in the development of the regime for space
debris may stem from security considerations. Significant proliferation of
space debris by space-incapable States and corporations will necessarily adversely affect the security interests of space-capable States. Thus, if the regime proposed above was adopted, but participants, particularly space-incapable States, failed to comply, incentives could be generated for legally binding mitigation targets. Were the security interests of space-capable States seriously undermined, even before a Kessler Syndrome materializes, they
would be incentivized to use their economic and military power to enforce
compliance with rigid debris standards. Whether or not such an eventuality
will occur, or whether it would be beneficial, remains to be seen.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Space activities by both public and private entities usher in a new age of
human development. But the new “Space Age” offers challenges in human
rights, governance, and environmental concerns. This article analyzed the
challenge to governance posed by space debris through the perspective of
389. See, e.g., Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 503–6.
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policy-oriented jurisprudence. It evaluated the development of the global order through a process of claims and counterclaims that will shape the development of the rules through a dynamic, evolutionary, international lawmaking process. Based on this analysis, the article proposed adopting a dynamic
regime to mitigate space debris as the next stage of the regime’s evolution
toward a feasible, effective, and manageable global order.
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